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n this, the 150th anniversary of statehood, it is appropriate to 
examine one of Oregon’s most conspicuous contributions to the 
American system of governance: direct democracy.  In 1902, the 
voters of Oregon amended the state constitution—the first time that 
they had done so—and adopted the initiative and referendum.  The 
initiative empowers citizens to petition to have statutory or 
constitutional measures put on the ballot for adoption.  The 
referendum, in turn, authorizes citizens by petition or the legislature 
by law to refer a legislatively enacted measure to the voters for 
approval.  Six years after the adoption of the initiative and 
referendum, Oregon voters completed their embrace of direct 
democracy, adopting (by constitutional initiative) the recall, in which 
citizens may petition to hold a special election to remove public 
officials from office.1 
Oregon’s role in the nationwide movement toward direct 
democracy was an important one.  Oregon was among the first states 
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1 THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 125–26 (1989). 
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to adopt the initiative and referendum,2 and it was the first state to 
adopt the recall.  Its status as an early adopter and the extensive 
debates within Oregon regarding the need for more popular 
involvement in lawmaking led early proponents (and opponents) of 
direct democracy to refer to it as the “Oregon system” or “Oregon 
plan.”3  Moreover, it was Oregon’s use of direct democracy—
specifically, the initiative—that was first challenged in the U.S. 
Supreme Court as violating the Guaranty Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which provides that “[t]he United States shall guarantee 
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”4  
Opponents assailed the initiative and referendum for bypassing the 
representative institutions that, according to them, served the 
constitutionally essential function of filtering and tempering the more 
volatile popular political will.5  In Pacific States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,6 however, the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
to decide the matter, holding instead that Guaranty Clause challenges 
to direct democracy posed a nonjusticiable political question. 
As a practical matter, the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to 
adjudicate the constitutionality of direct democracy opened the door 
to the adoption and use of direct democracy throughout the nation.  
Today, twenty-seven states provide for the initiative, referendum, or 
both.7  Election ballots in these states often contain numerous 
initiatives and referenda.8  In Oregon in particular, between 1902 and 
2007, Oregonians put 340 initiatives and 62 referenda on the ballot.  
 
2 Id. at 26.  South Dakota was the first to adopt the initiative and referendum in 1898, 
followed by Utah in 1900.  David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct 
Democracy: William Simon U’Ren and “The Oregon System,” 67 TEMP. L. REV. 947, 948 
n.7 (1994). 
3 See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 1332 (1911) (statement of Rep. Anderson); 47 CONG. REC. 
1445 (statement of Rep. Crumpacker); Otto Praeger, Direct Legislation Within the States, 
DALLAS NEWS, Apr. 7, 1911; see also Schuman, supra note 2, at 948 n.7 (citing ALLEN H. 
EATON, THE OREGON SYSTEM: THE STORY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION IN OREGON (1912)). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
5 See generally Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A 
Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513 (1962). 
6 223 U.S. 118, 149–51 (1912). 
7 M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 12 (2003). 
8 In the 2000 general election in Oregon, for example, there were eighteen constitutional 
and statutory initiatives, one statutory provision referred by petition, and two statutory 
provisions referred by the legislature on the ballot.  SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE 
BOOK 2001, at 316–17, available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/ 
elections22a.htm. 
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Of those, 118 of the initiatives and 21 of the referenda passed.9  
During the same period, the Oregon Legislature referred 407 
measures to the people, of which 233 passed.10  In the most recent 
election in 2008, there were twelve statewide measures on the ballot, 
and the state voter guide explaining the measures, along with pro and 
con statements from interested citizens, totaled 150 pages. 
In light of the widespread use of direct democracy in Oregon and 
elsewhere, this anniversary provides a good occasion to examine how 
direct democracy at the state and local levels became an accepted part 
of the American constitutional order.  In this Article, I argue that the 
constitutionality of direct democracy has never received the thorough 
judicial consideration that the issue deserves.  The Oregon Supreme 
Court, which validated the initiative and referendum, did so in a case 
that, significantly, did not involve an initiated or referred measure; it 
was decided on other, nonconstitutional grounds that obviated the 
need for the U.S Supreme Court to opine on the constitutionality of 
direct democracy.  By the time that the validity of direct democracy 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court several years later, the heated 
political controversy surrounding the adoption of direct democracy in 
several western states induced the Court in Pacific Telephone to avoid 
reaching the merits of the question.  The net result was to close the 
federal courts to constitutional challenges to direct democracy under 
the Guaranty Clause, a doctrine that has—erroneously in my view—
remained in place ever since. 
In Part I, I briefly recount the history of the adoption of direct 
democracy in Oregon.  In Part II, I turn to the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s validation of direct democracy in Kadderly v. City of 
Portland,11 showing how the unusual procedural posture in which the 
Guaranty Clause claim arose muddled the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
 
9 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK 2009, available at http://bluebook 
.state.or.us/state/elections/elections09.htm. 
10 Id.  The greater success of legislatively referred measures no doubt reflects the 
impact of the low threshold for popularly sponsored initiatives and referenda.  In contrast 
to a legislatively sponsored referendum, which must garner the support of a majority of 
both houses, an initiative or popularly sponsored referendum can be put on the ballot by a 
petition signed by only a small percentage (the exact requirement of which has varied over 
time) of the state’s citizens.  Currently, popularly sponsored referenda require four percent, 
initiatives for statutory measures require six percent, and initiatives for constitutional 
amendments require eight percent of the number of votes cast for governor in the 
preceding election to be put on the ballot.  BILL BRADBURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, 
OREGON BLUE BOOK 2003–04, at 296–313, available at http://bluebook 
.state.or.us/state/elections/elections06.htm 
11 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (Or. 1903). 
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consideration of the issue and produced an incomplete and ultimately 
unsatisfying theoretical reconciliation of direct democracy with 
republican government.  In Part III, I describe the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Pacific Telephone, with particular emphasis on the 
Court’s reliance on Luther v. Borden.12  In Part IV, I then assess the 
Court’s reasoning in Pacific Telephone, illustrating the flaws in the 
Court’s analysis.  Finally, in Part V, I offer a tentative explanation for 
why, in light of those analytical flaws, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
the way it did.  Interestingly, this story has less to do with Oregon, the 
state in which the case arose, and much more to do with Arizona, the 
state whose belabored efforts to become part of the Union helped split 
a party and end a presidency. 
I 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN OREGON 
The origins of Oregon’s adoption of the initiative and referendum 
lie in the Populist and Grange movements of the late nineteenth 
century.  That political history has been ably and comprehensively 
recounted by then-Professor, now-Judge David Schuman.13  In brief, 
in the late nineteenth century, many viewed the Oregon legislature as 
corrupt and beholden to moneyed interests.  As a way to bypass the 
legislature, the Oregon Populist Party proposed the adoption of the 
initiative and referendum.14  Although only four Populists were 
elected to the Oregon Legislature in 1895, a bill to convene a 
constitutional convention to adopt the initiative and referendum 
nearly passed.15 
Both disappointed and emboldened by their near success, 
Populists, such as William U’Ren, decided to push for a constitutional 
amendment adopting the initiative and referendum at the next session 
of the legislature two years later.  The switch in mechanism carried 
one significant drawback: unlike a constitutional convention, which at 
the time could be called by the legislature alone, a constitutional 
amendment had to be enacted by two, successive legislatures before 
 
12 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
13 See generally Schuman, supra note 2. 
14 Id. at 953.  In so doing, the state party was merely following the lead of the national 
Populist Party, which had formally embraced the initiative and referendum in its 1892 
party platform.  CRONIN, supra note 1, at 45. 
15 Schuman, supra note 2, at 953.  The Senate was evenly divided, and the House 
defeated the bill by only one vote.  Id. 
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then being put to the people for ratification.16  The legislature, 
however, failed to convene in 1897 due to a split in the state 
Republican Party.17  A special session that met in 1898 then handily 
defeated the Populists’ resolution. 
Dismayed, the Populist proponents of direct democracy regrouped 
and focused their energy on grass-root efforts to educate and mobilize 
popular support for the adoption of the initiative and referendum.  In 
1899, a new resolution calling for the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment was offered.  The proposed amendment provided in 
pertinent part that: 
[T]he people reserve to themselves power to propose laws and 
amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the 
polls, independent of the legislative assembly, and also reserve 
power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act of 
the legislative assembly.18 
 
16 OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (1857).  In 1906, the voters approved a constitutional 
amendment that required voter approval of any bill calling a constitutional convention. 
17 Schuman, supra note 2, at 954–55.  Republicans had a clear majority in the 
legislature but were split between traditional Republicans and so-called “Silver 
Republicans” who wished to dispense with the gold standard and who supported the 
adoption of the initiative and referendum.  After traditional Republicans secured the re-
election of their leader as U.S. Senator, Populist and Democratic lawmakers joined the 
Silver Republicans in refusing to attend the House’s sessions, depriving the House of the 
necessary quorum to convene.  After two months, legislators gave up on convening the 
legislature and returned home, earning the 1897 legislature the derogatory title as the 
“Hold-Up Legislature.”  Id. at 954. 
18 OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1902).  The amendment in full amended article IV, section 1 
to read: 
 The legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a legislative assembly, 
consisting of a senate and house of representatives, but the people reserve to 
themselves power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to 
enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislative assembly, and 
also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act of 
the legislative assembly.  The first power reserved by the people is the initiative, 
and not more than eight per cent of the legal voters shall be required to propose 
any measure by such petition, and every such petition shall include the full text 
of the measure so proposed.  Initiative petitions shall be filed with the secretary 
of state not less than four months before the election at which they are to be 
voted upon.  The second power is the referendum, and it may be ordered (except 
as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, 
or safety) either by the petition signed by five per cent of the legal voters, or by 
the legislative assembly, as other bills are enacted.  Referendum petitions shall be 
filed with the secretary of state not more than ninety days after the final 
adjournment of the session of the legislative assembly which passed the bill on 
which the referendum is demanded.  The veto power of the governor shall not 
extend to measures referred to the people.  All elections on measures referred to 
the people of the state shall be had at the biennial regular general elections, 
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As a result of the Populists’ campaign, which generated substantial 
popular support for the amendment, virtually all political opposition 
to the measure vanished.  Every political party in Oregon, except the 
Prohibitionists, endorsed the amendment.  The 1899 legislature 
passed the resolution easily.  The 1901 legislature, in turn, adopted 
the resolution with only one dissenting vote and ordered the 
amendment to be put to the people at an election the following year.  
On June 2, 1902, Oregon voters overwhelmingly approved the 
amendment by a vote of 62,024 in favor to 5668 opposed.19 
All subsequent efforts to roll back the initiative and referendum 
failed.  In 1905, conservative legislators introduced a bill calling a 
constitutional convention to revise the entire constitution, but the bill, 
which was viewed as a thinly disguised mechanism to repeal the 
initiative and referendum, was defeated.20  Moreover, the following 
year, to prevent similar efforts, Populists initiated and the voters 
approved a constitutional amendment requiring a referendum on any 
bill calling a constitutional convention.21  Even then, opponents of 
direct democracy persuaded the legislature to refer a measure calling 
a constitutional convention to the people, but voters overwhelmingly 
 
except when the legislative assembly shall order a special election.  Any measure 
referred to the people shall take effect and become the law when it is approved 
by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.  The style of all bills 
shall be: “Be it enacted by the people of the state of Oregon.”  This section shall 
not be construed to deprive any member of the legislative assembly of the right 
to introduce any measure.  The whole number of votes cast for justice of the 
supreme court at the regular election last preceding the filing of any petition for 
the initiative or for the referendum shall be the basis on which the number of 
legal voters necessary to sign such petition shall be counted.  Petitions and orders 
for the initiative and for the referendum shall be filed with the secretary of state, 
and in submitting the same to the people he, and all other officers, shall be 
guided by the general laws and the act submitting this amendment, until 
legislation shall be especially provided therefor. 
19 Schuman, supra note 2, at 956. 
20 Id. at 957.  Given the overwhelming popularity of direct democracy in Oregon at the 
time, a constitutional convention was the only plausible mechanism for conservatives to 
repeal the new amendment.  A convention might produce a new constitution that, while 
lacking provisions for direct democracy, was nevertheless so appealing to voters in other 
respects as to command popular assent.  In contrast, a constitutional amendment to repeal 
the 1902 amendment, which would necessarily be limited to that one subject, would have 
been easily defeated by voters. 
21 OR. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (“No convention shall be called to amend or propose 
amendments to this Constitution, or to propose a new Constitution, unless the law 
providing for such convention shall first be approved by the people on a referendum vote 
at a regular general election.”).  The measure passed with 47,661 in favor to 18,751 
opposed.  SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK 2003–2004, at 296, available at  
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections10.htm. 
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defeated the measure.22  For better or worse,23 the initiative and 
referendum were a settled part of the Oregon political landscape. 
The impact on Oregon lawmaking was immediate.  In 1906, 
Oregon voters used the initiative to amend the state constitution to 
grant “home rule” authority to local governments and to extend the 
initiative and referendum to local voters.24  In 1908, Oregon voters 
used the initiative to further expand direct democracy in Oregon, 
adopting the power of recall and, prior to the adoption of the 
Seventeenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, instructing the state 
legislature to elect as U.S. Senators those individuals selected by the 
people.25  And, in 1912, eight years prior to the adoption of the 
Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Oregon voters 
extended the right to vote to women.26  All told, between 1902 and 
1912, there were 102 initiated or referred measures put to Oregon 
voters.  The 1908 voter pamphlet describing the various measures on 
the ballot and including arguments pro and con totaled 126 pages; the 
1910 voter pamphlet ran over 200 pages.27  As one commentator at 
the time observed, Oregon voters had to be “not only exceedingly 
intelligent, but exceedingly well informed.”28  One might add 
exceedingly dedicated and patient, too. 
II 
THE MISSTEP OF KADDERLY 
Soon after their adoption, the constitutionality of the initiative and 
referendum was challenged in the Oregon courts, though in an 
unusual setting.  In January 1903, prior to the advent of home rule 
authority, the Oregon legislature approved a new charter for the City 
of Portland.  Among other provisions, the charter authorized the city 
to assess real property to pay for public improvements, such as roads 
and bridges.  Moreover, the legislature expressly provided that the 
charter was to go into effect immediately upon its approval by the 
 
22 Schuman, supra note 2, at 958. 
23 See id. at 958–60 (discussing uses and abuses of direct democracy in Oregon). 
24 Id. at 958. 
25 CRONIN, supra note 1, at 126. 
26 SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK 2003–2004, at 298, available at  
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections12.htm. 
27 Henry M. Campbell, The Initiative and Referendum, 10 MICH. L. REV. 427, 431 
(1912). 
28 Robert Treat Platt, Some Experiments in Direct Legislation, 18 YALE L.J. 40, 47 
(1908). 
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governor “to insure the health, peace, and safety of the people of 
Portland.”  The governor approved the charter, and, less than a month 
later, the Portland City Council adopted a resolution instructing the 
city auditor to prepare an assessment of certain parcels of property to 
pay for street improvements that had been completed. 
Seeking to avoid the assessment, a group of property owners filed 
suit challenging the city’s authority to undertake the assessment.  
Among other claims, the property owners alleged that the Portland 
Charter could not have gone into effect immediately because the 1902 
amendment required that the effective date of all legislative acts be 
delayed until ninety days after the adjournment of the legislature so as 
to allow the people the opportunity to exercise their referendum 
power.  As such, according to the property owners, the assessment 
ordinance, which had been passed within that ninety-day window, 
was invalid.  Defending the city’s authority to enact the ordinance, the 
city and its codefendants responded that the legislature had expressly 
exempted the Charter from the mandated ninety-day delay by 
invoking the need to act immediately to protect the “health, peace and 
safety” of the Portland residents.  The city argued further that, if the 
exception did not apply, the ninety-day delay was unconstitutional 
because the entire 1902 Amendment violated the Guaranty Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution. 
Several features of this litigation are striking.  First, the 
constitutionality of the initiative and referendum amendment did not 
arise in the context of a challenge to an initiated or referred measure.  
The Portland City Charter had been adopted by the legislature and 
approved by the governor.  Rather, the constitutionality of direct 
democracy was put before the court in a backdoor fashion via the 
challenge to the ninety-day delay for legislative measures.  Second, it 
was unclear that the 1902 amendment was responsible for this delay, 
and, even if it was, the challenge to the ninety-day delay hardly 
provided a proper case in which to analyze the constitutionality of the 
referendum power itself, let alone the constitutionality of the initiative 
power, which did not entail the ninety-day delay.29  Third, the 
 
29 The original 1857 Constitution specified the ninety-day delay for all legislative bills, 
except those in which the legislature inserted an emergency clause.  OR. CONST. art. IV, § 
28 (1857).  As a consequence, it could have been argued that the initiative and referendum 
amendment was not responsible for the ninety-day delay.  The Oregon Supreme Court in 
Kadderly, however, conclusively declared that the initiative and referendum amendment 
modified and limited the legislature’s power to exempt measures from the ninety-day 
delay.  See Kadderly v. City of Portland, 44 Or. 118, 147, 74 P. 710, 720 (1903) (declaring 
that article IV, section 28 “has been modified by the amendment of 1902, so as to exclude 
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constitutional challenge to direct democracy was not made by the 
property owners but rather by the city and its codefendants. 
The trial court dismissed the property owners’ complaint, and the 
case was appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court, which held that the 
city charter had validly gone into effect immediately upon its 
approval by the governor.  The court’s opinion in Kadderly v. City of 
Portland is a striking example of judicial overreach.  The court 
ultimately concluded that the legislature had properly invoked the 
exception to the ninety-day delay requirement by expressly 
referencing the need to act immediately to ensure the health and 
safety of the people of Portland.  That holding was sufficient to 
decide the case, obviating the need for the court to address the 
Guaranty Clause claim.30  Nevertheless, rather than rest solely on that 
determination, which was exclusively an issue of state law, the court 
chose to decide the federal constitutional issue as well.31 
The court began its federal constitutional analysis by 
acknowledging that the U.S. Constitution did not define or prescribe 
 
from the power to declare an emergency all laws except those necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the public peace, health, or safety”).  As the court would later explain in 
Sears v. Multnomah County, 49 Or. 42, 45, 88 P. 522, 523 (1907), without that limitation, 
the legislature could evade the referendum power by putting emergency clauses into laws 
not dealing with urgent threats to the public health or safety. 
 Even so, the amendment’s limitation on the legislature’s power to put laws into effect 
immediately was formally distinct from—and most likely severable from—the 
amendment’s conferral of the power of initiative and referendum on the people.  As such, 
the latter was not put before the court by the former, and, on the merits, there was no 
reasonable basis to believe the former violated the Guaranty Clause.  Surely, the people 
can mandate a ninety-day delay in the effectiveness of any or all legislative measures 
without implicating the Guaranty Clause—there is nothing in a republican form of 
government that would seemingly require that laws go into effect immediately.  Any 
limitation on the legislature’s power to exempt measures from such delay would therefore 
not implicate that clause. 
30 Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The 
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 25 (1993); Schuman, supra note 2, 
at 956. 
31 Hans Linde compares the Oregon Supreme Court’s action in Kadderly to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in which 
Chief Justice John Marshall resolved several other, nonconstitutional issues before turning 
to the constitutional question of the existence of the power of judicial review.  See Hans 
Linde, Kadderly at 100, 64 OR. ST. B. BULL. 17, 18 (2003).  In my view, that is an inapt 
comparison.  Marshall had to resolve those underlying nonconstitutional questions before 
turning to the constitutional one so as to make clear that the Court had no choice but to 
resolve the constitutional question.  To this day, the U.S. Supreme Court follows that rule 
of judicial decision making.  In contrast, the Oregon Supreme Court had resolved the case 
on a nonconstitutional ground that obviated the need for its exploration of the federal 
constitutional claim. 
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the form of a “republican” government.  Nevertheless, such a 
government, the court continued, must necessarily be one 
“administered by representatives chosen or appointed by the people or 
by their authority.”32  Of course, embracing that understanding of 
republican government placed direct democracy (or at least certain 
versions of it) in a constitutionally dubious position.  After all, the 
gravamen of the Guaranty Clause challenge was that initiated and 
referred measures were unrepublican precisely because they 
circumvented or subordinated, respectively, the representative 
process. 
The court’s response was to finesse the issue.  As the court 
declared, “the initiative and referendum amendment does not abolish 
or destroy the republican form of government, or substitute another in 
its place.”33  Rather, “[t]he government is still divided into the 
legislative, executive, and judicial departments, the duties of which 
are discharged by representatives selected by the people.”  The 
amendment did reserve some legislative power to the people directly, 
but “the legislative and executive departments are not destroyed, nor 
are their powers or authority materially curtailed.”  Elaborating, the 
court noted that initiated measures, although they bypassed both the 
legislature and executive, “are subject to the same constitutional 
limitations as other statutes, and may be amended or repealed by the 
Legislature at will.”  Though not mentioned expressly, referred 
measures were presumably valid for the same reason.  In short, in the 
court’s view, the Guaranty Clause only forbade governmental 
processes that abolished the representative branches of government or 
that “materially curtailed” the representative process by placing 
legislative measures beyond judicial review or legislative correction. 
The Oregon Supreme Court’s resolution of the Guaranty Clause 
issue was hardly conclusive as to all forms of direct democracy.  As 
Hans Linde has pointed out, the court’s interpretation avoided entirely 
the constitutionality of initiated constitutional amendments, which are 
manifestly beyond the legislature’s ability to amend or repeal.34  
Likewise, its interpretation of the Guaranty Clause offered no clear 
guidance as to the validity of local direct democracy, particularly 
where, as in Oregon, the state constitution grants “home rule” 
 
32 Kadderly, 44 Or. at 146, 74 P. at 719. 
33 Kadderly, 44 Or. at 147, 74 P. at 720. 
34 Linde, supra note 30, at 26–27. 
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authority to local governments.35  To say that direct democracy does 
not “materially curtail” the power of the state legislature does not 
address the propriety of popularly enacted measures at the local level, 
which measures often are constitutionally immune from correction by 
the state legislature. 
Even as to those types of popularly enacted measures within its 
purview, the court’s reasoning was far from satisfactory.  In a sense, 
statewide initiatives and referenda did “materially curtail” the 
representative process; indeed, that was the whole point of such 
measures.  The proponents of direct democracy had sold it to the 
people precisely as a mechanism to avoid the legislature, which was 
viewed as venal and corrupt.  Perhaps the court could find refuge in 
the formalist distinction, which it evidently sought to make, that direct 
democracy “curtails” the representative process but not “materially” 
so.  Yet, that analytical move requires a far more robust description of 
what it means to “materially curtail” the representative process.  None 
was forthcoming.  Moreover, the court’s reliance on the fact that 
popularly enacted measures in Oregon would be subject to judicial 
review and subsequent legislative amendment or repeal hardly 
sufficed.  The former was beside the point—the availability of 
judicial review of the merits of popularly enacted measures was 
surely not a sufficient substitute for legislative approval.  Republican 
government must necessarily involve more than judicial review.  And 
the latter rested on a curiously simplistic understanding of the 
legislative process.  The court seemed to assume that any popularly 
enacted measure could become or remain law only with the 
legislature’s approval (either expressly because it enacted the measure 
or tacitly because it refused to amend or repeal it).  Yet, as students of 
the legislative process understand, the legislature’s failure—or, even 
more obviously, its inability36—to amend or repeal a law hardly 
denotes its approval of the measure. 
 
35 In fairness, the validity of such local direct democracy could not be foreseen at the 
time of the Kadderly decision.  It was only after Kadderly, in 1906, that the people of 
Oregon by constitutional initiative adopted a state constitutional amendment adopting 
home rule authority for cities.  OR. CONST. art. XI, § 2; see also Cynthia Cumfer, Original 
Intent v. Modern Judicial Philosophy: Oregon’s Home Rule Case Frames the Dilemma for 
State Constitutionalism, 76 OR. L. REV. 909 (1997) (discussing history of measure).  That 
same year, the Oregon legislature referred a constitutional amendment authorizing local 
initiatives and referenda, which was approved by the people. 
36 Any subsequent legislative effort to modify or repeal a popularly enacted measure is 
subject to the governor’s veto, which can only be overridden by a two-thirds vote of each 
house.  OR. CONST. art. V, § 15b. 
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Likewise, the Oregon Supreme Court failed to appreciate the 
impact of direct democracy on the executive’s authority.  Both 
initiated and referred laws circumvent the governor’s veto by 
allowing for the enactment of measures without her assent.  
Moreover, in the context of measures referred to the people by the 
legislature itself, the referendum process could be strategically 
deployed by the legislature precisely to avoid a gubernatorial veto.  In 
short, direct democracy could be said not only to weaken the 
representative process as a whole, but also to tilt it in favor of the 
legislature at the expense of the executive by giving the former the 
choice as to whether to seek gubernatorial or popular assent to its 
measures. 
One plausible answer to this concern was that the Guaranty Clause 
did not require states to vest the executive branch with a legislative 
veto—that an executive veto was not a necessary component of a 
“republican form of government.”  Under this view, limiting the veto 
power did not violate the clause because the greater power to dispense 
with the veto entirely included the lesser power to limit its 
applicability exclusively to certain types of measures, such as 
legislative bills.  Such a view has strong historical and theoretical 
support.  Strikingly, however, the Oregon Supreme Court implicitly 
rejected it, offering instead a paean to the executive veto as “one of 
the safeguards against hasty or ill-advised legislation which is 
everywhere regarded as essential.”37 
Rather, the court dismissed this aspect of the constitutional 
challenge on the ground that “[t]he veto power of the Governor is not 
abridged in any way, except as to such laws as the Legislature may 
refer to the people.”  That, of course, was factually untrue: initiated 
measures also avoid the executive veto.  More importantly, 
acknowledging that the executive veto power is abridged with respect 
to legislatively referred measures hardly addressed the constitutional 
concern regarding such abridgment.  If one believes (as the court did) 
that the gubernatorial veto is an “essential” check on the legislature, it 
is not clear how the legislature’s power to refer measures directly to 
the people for approval can be tolerated.  A legislature wishing to 
enact a measure that it knows the governor will veto may act 
strategically and refer the measure to the people directly, thereby 
bypassing the gubernatorial veto. 
 
37 Kadderly, 44 Or. at 147, 74 P. at 720. 
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In short, the Kadderly court was able to endorse direct democracy 
only by erroneously minimizing just how much the initiative and 
referendum transformed the structure of Oregon lawmaking.  To be 
sure, the power of initiative and referendum had only been adopted by 
the people of Oregon the year before, so perhaps the court could be 
excused for its inability to perceive just how transformative the new 
powers of popular lawmaking would prove to be.  Yet, given that the 
measure before it was not an initiated or referred one, and given that 
the court did not need to reach the constitutional issue in light of its 
holding regarding the inapplicability of the ninety-day waiting period, 
it is hard not to condemn the court for its rush to opine on the 
constitutionality of the initiative and referendum.  The relationship 
between republican government and direct democracy was, and is, a 
fraught one, deserving a more thorough and nuanced analysis than 
Kadderly offered. 
Despite the weaknesses in its analysis, Kadderly was not reviewed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The city and its codefendants that had 
raised the Guaranty Clause claim had prevailed and therefore had no 
reason to seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Conversely, the 
property owners who lost had no reason to challenge the court’s 
Guaranty Clause analysis.  Because the ninety-day delay requirement 
predated the initiative and referendum amendment, which, according 
to the Oregon Supreme Court, only narrowed the legislature’s 
discretion to exempt measures from that delay, the invalidation of that 
amendment on Guaranty Clause grounds would not have invalidated 
the legislature’s decision to put the Portland City Charter into 
immediate effect.  Moreover, even if the owners had sought review, 
the fact that the decision rested on an issue of state law negated the 
existence of jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court.  Not only were 
the Oregon Supreme Court’s ruminations about direct democracy and 
the Guaranty Clause pure dicta, it was precisely because they were 
dicta that rendered federal review impossible. Until the U.S. Supreme 
Court was confronted with a case presenting the Guaranty Clause 
issue in a federally cognizable fashion, Kadderly’s questionable 
validation of direct democracy would remain on the books. 
With U.S. Supreme Court review unavailable for the time being, 
Kadderly set the stage for the judicial embrace of direct democracy, 
both in Oregon and elsewhere.  In 1906, the voters of Oregon 
amended the constitution again to provide for initiative and referenda 
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at the local level,38 and, when the measure was challenged on 
Guaranty Clause grounds, the Oregon Supreme Court invoked 
Kadderly to uphold the measure.39  Meanwhile, outside Oregon, 
several other state supreme courts, including those in California and 
Oklahoma relied upon Kadderly in upholding their systems of direct 
democracy.40  As one commentator put it, “[b]y 1912 the initiative 
and referendum seemed secure from judicial attack.”41 
III 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND PACIFIC TELEPHONE 
The constitutionality of the direct democracy finally made it to the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1912 in Pacific States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon.42  In 1903, the Oregon legislature enacted 
an annual license fee, which ranged in amount from $10 to $200, on 
all corporations doing business in the state.43  In 1906, at the same 
time that they were extending the initiative and referendum power to 
local voters, Oregon voters initiated and approved a two percent tax 
on the gross receipts of telephone and telegraph companies as a 
license fee for doing business within the state.44  Pacific States 
Telephone, an Oregon corporation, refused to pay the newly initiated 
tax, and the state filed suit to collect the delinquent, unpaid taxes.  
The company defended its refusal to pay on, among other grounds, 
the basis that the initiative process violated the Guaranty Clause and 
therefore the initiated tax was unconstitutional.45 
In several respects, Pacific States was a good vehicle for the 
Oregon courts to assess the validity of direct democracy.  Unlike 
Kadderly, Pacific States involved a constitutional challenge to an 
initiated measure.  Moreover, the challenge was presented after the 
 
38 The measure passed 47,678 in favor to 16,735 opposed.  SECRETARY OF STATE, 
OREGON BLUE BOOK 2007, available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/ 
elections10.htm. 
39 Kiernan v. City of Portland, 57 Or. 454, 469, 112 P. 402, 404 (1910). 
40 In re Pfahler, 88 P. 270 (Cal. 1906); Ex parte Wagner, 95 P. 435 (Okla. 1908). 
41 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 264 
(Cornell Univ. Press 1972). 
42 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
43 H.B. 2, 1903 Leg., 22nd Sess. (Or. 1903). 
44 The measure passed 70,872 in favor to 6360 opposed.  SECRETARY OF STATE, 
OREGON BLUE BOOK 2007, available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/ 
elections10.htm. 
45 State v. Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co., 53 Or. 162, 163, 99 P. 427, 427 (1909). 
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passage of the measure, allowing the court to see more fully how 
direct democracy played out in this particular circumstance.  Had they 
wanted to, the Oregon courts could have looked into both the origin 
of the measure (e.g., had the Legislature considered such a measure?  
If so, on what basis was it defeated?) and the nature of the popular 
campaign for it (e.g., who had sponsored the initiative?  How had the 
campaign for it been waged?).  The answer to those questions would 
have yielded substantial insight into the need for and potential 
dangers of direct democracy, thereby providing much needed context 
for assessing the relationship of direct democracy to republican 
government.  Unfortunately, no such inquiry was undertaken.  The 
Oregon Supreme Court summarily rejected the company’s 
constitutional claim on the basis of Kadderly,46 and the company filed 
a writ of error in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in turn, dismissed the writ of error for 
lack of jurisdiction, holding unanimously that a constitutional 
challenge to the initiative and referendum power under the Guaranty 
Clause presented a nonjusticiable “political question.”47  The Court 
began its analysis by characterizing the Guaranty Clause claim as 
necessarily focusing on the state governmental process as a whole.  
Either a state’s government viewed in its entirety was republican in 
form or it was not; particular lawmaking processes in the state would 
not be analyzed separately to determine whether they were republican 
in character.48  Viewing the Guaranty Clause challenge in this broad 
sense raised the stakes for the litigation, as the Court itself realized.  If 
the company’s challenge were upheld, the Court warned, it would 
necessarily affect the validity, not only of the particular statute 
which is before us, but of every other statute passed in Oregon since 
the adoption of the initiative and referendum.  And indeed the 
propositions go further than this, since in their essence they assert 
that there is no governmental function, legislative or judicial, in 
 
46 Pacific Telephone, 53 Or. at 165, 99 P. at 428 (“Whether the initiative and 
referendum amendment to the Constitution is invalid, because repugnant to the provisions 
of the Constitution of the United States, was thoroughly argued to and considered by this 
court in Kadderly v. Portland, and the views of the court as then and now entertained are 
indicated in the opinion filed in that case, and it is needless to restate them at this time.”). 
47 Pacific Telephone, 223 U.S. at 150.  At the time, there were only eight justices on the 
Court.  Justice John Marshall Harlan died on October 14, 1911, while Pacific Telephone 
was pending, and his replacement, Justice Mahlon Pitney, was not sworn in until March 
18, 1912, after the case had been decided.  See U.S. Supreme Court, Members of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
about/members.pdf. 
48 Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 141 (1912). 
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Oregon, because it cannot be assumed, if the proposition be well 
founded, that there is at one and the same time one and the same 
government which is republican in form, and not of that character.49 
So viewed, the company’s Guaranty Clause challenge threatened to 
wreak “anomalous and destructive effects upon both the state and 
national governments.”50 
This premise regarding the nature and broad scope of a Guaranty 
Clause challenge formed the linchpin of the Court’s ensuing analysis.  
First, as a policy matter, the Court worried that enforcing the 
Guaranty Clause would entail a ruinous expansion of the judicial 
power.  In the Court’s view, to allow the company’s challenge to go 
forward would invite every citizen wishing to be free of some state 
tax or regulation “to assail in a court of justice the rightful existence 
of the state.”  Moreover, were any such challenge upheld, not only 
would the federal court necessarily have to decree the invalidity of the 
existing state government, it would also have the duty and power “to 
build by judicial action upon the ruins of the previously established 
government” and reconstitute a new state government lest “anarchy is 
to ensue.”51  The Court’s view of such consequences was clear: 
 Do the provisions of § 4, Art. IV, bring about these strange, far-
reaching and injurious results?  That is to say, do the provisions of 
that Article obliterate the division between judicial authority and 
legislative power upon which the Constitution rests?  In other 
words, do they authorize the judiciary to substitute its judgment as 
to a matter purely political for the judgment of Congress on a 
subject committed to it and thus overthrow the Constitution upon 
the ground that thereby the guarantee to the States of a government 
republican in form may be secured, a conception which after all 
rests upon the assumption that the States are to be guaranteed a 
government republican in form by destroying the very existence of 
a government republican in form in the Nation.52 
For the Court, to state these questions was to answer them. 
Second, construing the Guaranty Clause challenge in this global, 
all-or-nothing approach brought into play the Court’s decision a half-
century earlier in Luther v. Borden.53  To fully understand and 
evaluate the Court’s invocation of Luther, it is important to delve into 
the facts of that case in some detail.  Luther arose out of a truly 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 141–42. 
52 Id. at 142. 
53 48 U.S. 1 (1849). 
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remarkable event in antebellum American history: the “Dorr 
Rebellion.”  In the 1840s, Rhode Island, alone among the states, still 
operated under its royal charter, which had been issued by Charles II 
in 1663.54  Among other defects, the charter provided for an 
apportionment of the legislature that, almost two centuries out of date, 
grossly underrepresented the political influence of the newly 
urbanizing cities.55  Even more problematically, only men owning 
$134 of real property and their eldest sons were entitled to vote.56  As 
a consequence, by 1841, there were less than 10,000 freemen entitled 
to vote out of an adult male population of approximately 25,000 and a 
total state population of more than 108,000.57 
After several attempts to persuade the Rhode Island General 
Assembly to reform the charter failed, proponents of constitutional 
reform called their own constitutional convention, which proposed a 
new constitution known as the “People’s Constitution.”58  Bypassing 
the charter government, supporters of the People’s Constitution put 
their proposed constitution directly to the people for ratification at 
town meetings at which all adult, white, male residents could vote.  
The People’s Constitution was overwhelmingly ratified (13,947 in 
favor to fifty-two opposed).59  At the same time, the assembly called 
a constitutional convention, which also proposed a new constitution 
known as the “Freeholders’ Constitution.”  The Freeholders’ 
Constitution resembled the People’s Constitution in large part.60  
Moreover, attempting to co-opt the reformist opposition, the charter 
 
54 WIECEK, supra note 41, at 86. 
55 MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN, THE DORR REBELLION: A STUDY IN AMERICAN 
RADICALISM: 1833–1849, at 6 (1980). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. app. B, at 234. 
58 THE PEOPLE’S CONVENTION, THE PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTION (1841), reprinted in 
GETTLEMAN, supra note 55, app. A, at 205–31. 
59 WIECEK, supra note 41, at 91.  Not only did the nearly 14,000 votes in favor of 
ratification of the People’s Constitution constitute a majority of the adult male population, 
a majority of freemen (4925 out of approximately 9500 in the state) participated in the 
election and voted in favor of ratification.  GETTLEMAN, supra note 55, at 54.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the significance of the popular ratification of the 
People’s Constitution, noting that, not only had the charter government refused to 
authorize its submission to the people for ratification, the informal, “voluntary” process 
used by its proponents was biased in favor of ratification.  Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 36 
(1849). 
60 WIECEK, supra note 41, at 91 n.14.  Both proposed constitutions, for example, 
excluded African-Americans but otherwise empowered most adult, white males to vote.  
GETTLEMAN, supra note 55, at 61, 209. 
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government provided that all native born, white, adult citizens were 
entitled to vote in the election to ratify the Freeholders’ 
Constitution.61  The Freeholders’ Constitution, however, was 
narrowly defeated (8013 in favor to 8689 opposed).62 
The adoption of the People’s Constitution and ensuing rejection of 
the Freeholders’ Constitution produced a political crisis in Rhode 
Island.  The charter government Assembly passed a law banning the 
formation of any government under the People’s Constitution and 
ultimately declared martial law.63  Undeterred, the reformists held 
elections for state offices under the People’s Constitution and elected 
Thomas Dorr as the People’s Governor.  The People’s Legislature 
convened for two days in early May 1842 but hastily adjourned.64  
Dorr and other reformists first sought assistance from President Tyler 
and then attempted to seize the Providence arsenal, but both efforts 
were unsuccessful.65  Dorr attempted to regroup and rally his 
supporters in Chepachet, Rhode Island.66  In response, Governor 
Samuel King called out the state militia to suppress what he and other 
supporters of the charter government saw as an illegitimate, armed 
insurrection.  Before the militia reached Chepachet, however, Dorr 
fled to New Hampshire.  In his absence, the People’s Government 
collapsed.67 
Although the People’s Government was a failure, the reformists 
succeeded in producing constitutional reform.  In November 1842, 
just a few months after the collapse of the People’s Government, the 
voters approved a new constitution that expanded suffrage to almost 
all adult men, including (unlike the People’s Constitution) African-
Americans, and that partially redressed the malapportionment of the 
Assembly.68  The new Constitution took effect in May 1843.  Dorr 
himself, however, could not take much solace from this victory: when 
Dorr subsequently returned to Rhode Island, he was arrested, tried 
and convicted of treason, and sentenced to life imprisonment.69 
 
61 GETTLEMAN, supra note 55, at 61. 
62 Id. at 79 n.97. 
63 Id. at 90; Luther, 48 U.S. at 37. 
64 GETTLEMAN, supra note 55, at 101–03. 
65 Id. at 108–12, 120–22. 
66 WIECEK, supra note 41, at 98. 
67 Id. at 98–99. 
68 GETTLEMAN, supra note 55, at 144–47. 
69 WIECEK, supra note 41, at 99.  Governor Jackson subsequently released Dorr, and, in 
1854, the Rhode Island legislature formally reversed his conviction.  Id. at 100. 
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The adoption of a new, reformed constitution would seem to have 
been the end of the story, but the validity of the Dorr Rebellion was 
presented to the federal courts in a run-of-the-mill tort suit.  After the 
collapse of the People’s Government, the charter government engaged 
in a systematic campaign to roundup and punish supporters of the 
Dorr government.70  In late June 1842, a posse of Rhode Island 
militia forcibly entered and searched the house of Martin Luther, a 
supporter of the People’s Government.71  Luther subsequently sued 
the members of the posse, including Luther Borden, for trespass in 
federal court.72  The members of the posse defended their action on 
the ground that they were members of the Rhode Island militia and 
were discharging their legal duties under the law of the legitimate 
government of Rhode Island.  In response, Luther sought to prove that 
the Charter Government was unrepublican, that the People’s 
Government was in fact the legitimate government of the state of 
Rhode Island, and that therefore Borden and the posse were not acting 
under legitimate authority.73  The jury found in favor of Borden and 
the defendants, and Luther appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney ruled that the 
federal courts were bound to accept the Rhode Island courts’ 
determination that the Charter Government was the legitimate 
government of the state.  According to Taney, this rule sprang in part 
from the general rule of comity—that federal courts are bound by 
state court determinations on points of state law.74  It also rested on 
pragmatic grounds—that there were no principled, apolitical grounds 
upon which a federal court could evaluate and determine which of 
two competing governments was the legitimate one.75  Indeed, Taney 
was fearful of the consequences of allowing federal courts to 
undertake the inquiry that Luther proposed.  Expressing concerns that 
would be reprised a half-century later in Pacific Telephone, Taney 
declared: 
For, if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry as proposed 
by the plaintiff, and it should be decided that the charter 
 
70 See GETTLEMAN, supra note 55, at 141. 
71 Id. at 142. 
72 Id. at 178.  Luther was able to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal circuit court 
based on diversity of citizenship; before the posse arrived, Luther fled to Massachusetts.  
Id. 
73 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 32–35 (1849). 
74 Id. at 40. 
75 Id. at 41–42. 
 998 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 979 
government had no legal existence during the period of time above 
mentioned,—if it had been annulled by the adoption of the opposing 
government,—then the laws passed by its legislature during that 
time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected; its salaries and 
compensation to its officers illegally paid; its public accounts 
improperly settled; and the judgments and sentences of its courts in 
civil and criminal cases null and void, and the officers who carried 
their decisions into operation answerable as trespassers, if not in 
some cases as criminals.76 
In light of those consequences, the U.S. Supreme Court was unwilling 
to enter such an inquiry unless the Constitution clearly demanded it, 
which, in the Court’s view, it did not. 
Taney then turned to the Guaranty Clause.  His analysis was brief 
and conclusory: “Under this article of the Constitution,” Taney wrote, 
“it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established 
one in a State.”77  Congress does so, Taney continued, by seating the 
representatives and senators from the state, and, when it does so “its 
decision is binding on every other department of the government, and 
could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.”78  The determination 
as to which government was legitimate, like the determination as to 
which government was republican in character, was a political, not 
judicial question. 
Taney’s analysis of the Guaranty Clause leaves much to be desired.  
The Court’s declaration that Congress’s determination is binding on 
the federal courts conflicted with its ruling just a few moments earlier 
that the state court’s determination on this point was authoritative and 
binding.  Whose decision bound the federal courts if Congress seated 
senators selected by a government that the state courts had rejected?  
Moreover, as even Taney realized,79 Congress’s “decision” to seat the 
representatives and senators from Rhode Island hardly denoted its 
approval of the Charter Government.  The representatives and 
senators had been seated without debate in May 1841—over a year 
before the People’s Government had been formed.80  Once it did 
assemble in early May 1842, the People’s Government did not send 
 
76 Id. at 38–39. 
77 Id. at 42. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (“It is true that the contest in this case did not last long enough to bring the matter 
to this issue; and as no senators or representatives were elected under the authority of the 
government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was not called upon to decide the 
controversy.”). 
80 10 CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1841). 
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senators to Congress, let alone set a date for the election of a new 
slate of representatives, to contest the seats occupied by the senators 
and representatives selected by and under the auspices of, 
respectively, the Charter Government.81  In the absence of express 
congressional debate and resolution regarding which government was 
the legitimate, republican one, it was beside the point whether the 
Court was bound by Congress’s authoritative determination.  The 
question before the Court was not its authority to act when Congress 
had resolved the matter, but rather its power when Congress had not.  
Taney’s conclusory response that, nevertheless, “the right to decide is 
placed there [in Congress], and not in the courts” begged the 
question.82 
In any event, it was this dramatic episode in American history and 
the Court’s refusal to step into the middle of it that the Pacific 
Telephone Court found dispositive of the company’s Guaranty Clause 
challenge to Oregon’s initiated license tax.  The Court recounted at 
length the Rhode Island events and quoted extensively from the 
Court’s decision in Luther, which the Court lauded as having “never 
been doubted or questioned since.”  The Court did not explain 
Luther’s relevance, but the evident proposition of law that the Court 
drew from that decision was that, as a categorical matter, all Guaranty 
Clause challenges were nonjusticiable because such challenges 
invariably put the Court in the position of evaluating and potentially 
negating the existence of an entire state government. 
Having raised the stakes in this fashion and thereby called into play 
its decision in Luther, the Court quickly proceeded to its ultimate 
conclusion that the determination whether the adoption of the 
initiative and referendum was consistent with a republican form of 
government was a political question to be resolved by Congress, not 
by the federal courts.  As the Court saw it, the company’s challenge 
was not to “the tax as a tax, but on the State as a State,” requiring that 
Oregon “establish its right to exist as a State, republican in form.”83  
Such an attack was, the Court concluded, “political and governmental, 
and embraced within the scope of the powers conferred upon 
Congress, and not therefore within the reach of judicial power.”84 
 
81 GETTLEMAN, supra note 55, at 102–03. 
82 Luther, 48 U.S. at 42. 
83 Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150–51 (1912). 
84 Id. at 151. 
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The same day as it handed down its decision in Pacific Telephone, 
the Court also issued its decision in Kiernan v. City of Portland.85  
That case involved a Guaranty Clause challenge to direct democracy 
at the local level, and, just as the Oregon Supreme Court had cursorily 
upheld Oregon’s adoption of the municipal initiative and referendum 
on the basis of Kadderly, the U.S. Supreme Court blithely dismissed 
the Guaranty Clause challenge as nonjusticiable on the basis of 
Pacific Telephone.86  In short, regardless of the differences among the 
various forms of direct democracy, the Court had made clear that the 
federal courts were closed to Guaranty Clause challenges to direct 
democracy.  The implications for direct democracy were not lost on 
contemporary observers.  As one progressive journal reported with 
glee just weeks after Pacific Telephone was decided, the Supreme 
Court’s decision meant that “there is no obstacle to the adoption of 
the initiative and referendum by any State in the Union.”87 
IV 
THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT, 
AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
Pacific Telephone was a deeply flawed decision.  As noted above, 
the linchpin in the Court’s conclusion that Pacific Telephone 
presented a nonjusticiable political question was its assumption that 
Guaranty Clause challenges necessarily focused on the republican 
character of the state government viewed as a whole.  Yet, the Court 
never explained why that was so—why it could not evaluate 
particular lawmaking processes within the state government as 
republican or not.  Surely the Guaranty Clause itself did not compel 
the Court to take the state government as an undifferentiated whole.  
Congress, for example, could presumably refuse to admit proposed 
states or seat representatives and senators from already admitted 
states that had adopted particular forms of lawmaking that, in its 
view, were unrepublican.  Indeed, just a few months before Pacific 
Telephone was decided, Congress had engaged in precisely that type 
of focused inquiry.88  Moreover, were the rule any other, states could 
 
85 223 U.S. 151 (1912). 
86 Id. at 163–64. 
87 Direct Legislation Not Unconstitutional, OUTLOOK, Mar. 9, 1912, at 516. 
88 See infra text accompanying notes 130–39 (discussing congressional debates over 
initiative, referendum, and recall provisions in proposed Arizona constitution).  In fact, 
during the congressional debate, Senator George Sutherland, the future U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice, expressly endorsed Congress’s authority to engage in such piecemeal 
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easily evade the requirements of the Guaranty Clause by embedding 
unrepublican lawmaking processes within a larger framework of 
republican processes.89  And, if Congress can engage in such 
individualized review, surely the courts can too. 
Perhaps the Court meant only to suggest that the sole judicial 
remedy for a violation of the Guaranty Clause was the wholesale 
invalidation of the state government.  There is no support, however, 
for such a necessarily thermonuclear reading of the Guaranty Clause.  
The constitutional guarantee may run to the state as a whole, but, as 
Larry Tribe has observed, when the whole foundation of the 
constitutional challenge is that a state government has been rendered 
unrepublican by the adoption of a particular lawmaking process, the 
remedy would properly be to invalidate the problem-causing process, 
not dispatch the entire state government.90  Likewise, invalidating 
laws produced via an unrepublican process does not necessarily 
require the invalidation of laws produced via republican processes.  
To be sure, there are conceivable, though implausible, scenarios in 
which the constitutional violation is so great and pervasive as to call 
into question the entire state government.  For example, suppose that 
a state were to dispense entirely with its legislature and vest all power 
in a hereditary governor (i.e., a monarch).  Even if the remedy there 
would be to invalidate the entire state government and all its actions, 
that would not compel the same broad remedy when the violation is 
not so extensive.  More modestly, there may be occasions in which an 
unrepublican process is so intertwined with a republican process that 
the invalidity of the former calls into question the validity of the 
latter, but traditional principles of severability would identify those 
situations and provide for an appropriate but still limited remedy.  In 
short, there is nothing in the Guaranty Clause that would require the 
Court to invalidate an entire state government and all its actions 
 
analysis of individual state lawmaking processes under the Guaranty Clause.  See, e.g., 47 
CONG. REC. 2794 (1911) (statement of Sen. Sutherland); see also 47 CONG. REC. 3712 
(statement of Sen. Crawford) (noting that “provision” in proposed Arizona constitution 
was “unrepublican”). 
89 Suppose, for example, a hypothetical state decided to vest the power over some area 
of public policy, say the disposal of solid waste, exclusively in an unreviewable, hereditary 
monarch.  Lawmaking with regard to all other matters remained vested in the popularly 
elected legislature, subject to a qualified veto by the popularly elected governor.  The 
hereditary monarchy is clearly unrepublican, yet the state government as a whole still 
appears more republican than not. 
90 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-13, at 369 (3d ed. 
2000). 
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merely because one distinct aspect of the government is unrepublican 
in character. 
Focusing (as the Court should have) on the individual lawmaking 
process challenged by the telephone company would have had two 
dramatic consequences for the Court’s analysis in Pacific Telephone.  
First, such a piecemeal approach would have laid to rest the Court’s 
professed consequentialist fear that upholding the telephone 
company’s challenge would necessarily require negating the existence 
of the entire Oregon state government, invalidating all the laws 
enacted in Oregon in the ten years since direct democracy had been 
adopted, and thereby requiring the federal courts to fashion by 
judicial edict a new government from the ruins of the old.  The 
gravamen of the company’s constitutional challenge was that the 
initiative and referendum process itself was unrepublican, not that all 
lawmaking processes in Oregon were.  Because the Oregon system of 
direct democracy was adopted in a constitutional amendment, 
traditional principles of severability clearly pointed toward treating 
the initiative and referendum as distinct and severable from the 
preexisting system of legislative lawmaking under the original, 
unamended state constitution.  Moreover, the invalidation of such 
process would only have called into question those measures adopted 
pursuant to it, not all acts of the state government since 1902.91 
Second, the piecemeal approach would have eliminated the 
relevance of Luther v. Borden to this and other Guaranty Clause 
challenges to individual lawmaking processes.  Luther was applicable 
only because, in the Court’s view, both cases asked the judiciary to 
invalidate an entire state government and all the acts undertaken by it.  
The piecemeal approach, of course, avoids this eventuality.  Unlike 
Luther, in which a decision on the merits would have negated the 
existence of either the Charter or People’s Government, Pacific 
Telephone involved a Guaranty Clause claim that could be upheld 
without imperiling the validity of state government in Oregon.  In 
short, Luther was inapposite. 
Recasting the Guaranty Clause analysis in this less revolutionary 
and disruptive fashion does not mean by itself that the Court was 
wrong to hold that Pacific Telephone presented a nonjusticiable 
political question.  Without the specter of governmental Armageddon 
 
91 In the elections between 1902 and 1912, when Pacific Telephone was decided, there 
were thirty-three initiatives adopted by Oregon voters.  SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON 
BLUE BOOK 2009, available at http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections09.htm. 
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or the seemingly dispositive precedent of Luther to undergird it, 
though, the argument for treating the Guaranty Clause as 
nonjusticiable evaporates.  As the Court subsequently elucidated in 
Baker v. Carr,92 the political question doctrine turns upon whether 
there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” of the 
resolution of the constitutional issue to a coordinate branch or 
whether there is a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards” to guide the courts’ resolution of the matter.93  Neither of 
those circumstances existed with respect to the Guaranty Clause 
challenge to Oregon’s system of direct democracy. 
Take the argument that the Guaranty Clause commits its 
enforcement to Congress and the President, not to the courts.  This is 
what Taney seemed to imply in Luther, but, on examination, there is 
no support for the view that the Constitution entrusts the enforcement 
of the Guaranty Clause exclusively to the political branches.  
Certainly the text of the Guaranty Clause, which should be the 
foundation of any “textually demonstrable” commitment of the issue, 
does not expressly mandate its resolution by the political branches 
and them alone.94  The Guaranty Clause refers to the “United States,” 
not “Congress” or “the President,” as the guarantor of republican 
government, and there is nothing in the term “United States” that 
necessarily excludes the federal judiciary.95  Indeed, as Arthur 
Bonfield first observed, the fact that the Guaranty Clause was placed 
by the framers in Article IV, not Article I or II, suggests that the 
guarantee was one for the entire federal government to ensure, not 
just the political branches.96 
Moreover, as a functional matter, there is little to commend 
congressional enforcement as the exclusive remedial mechanism.  As 
others have argued, Congress is in an exceptionally poor position to 
guarantee republican government in the states.  Congress’s authority 
to refuse to seat representatives and senators from an unrepublican 
state—the mechanism envisioned by Taney in Luther—is more 
formal than real.  The perfunctory ceremony held at the beginning of 
each biennial Congress is hardly the forum for a comprehensive and 
probing assessment of the republican bona fides of each state’s 
 
92 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
93 Id. at 217. 
94 See WIECEK, supra note 41, at 287. 
95 See id. at 301. 
96 Bonfield, supra note 5, at 523. 
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government.97  And, as Luther illustrated, developments in the state 
may unfold in ways that significantly delay or even preclude 
congressional review.98  Furthermore, even if Congress were to 
consider the republican bona fides of individual states, the draconian 
nature of the sanction—depriving a state of its congressional 
representation—would surely make Congress reluctant to act except 
in the most extreme circumstances.99  For that reason, some 
congressmen have contradicted Taney’s prescription in Luther and 
disputed Congress’s authority to refuse to seat congressional 
delegations.100 
Alternatively, one could argue that the Guaranty Clause lacks the 
judicially manageable standards necessary for judicial enforcement, 
but that is an even more dubious route to take.  To be sure, the 
meaning of a “republican form of government” is far from clear, but, 
the interpretive ambiguity present in that phrase is surely no greater 
than that in “freedom of speech,” the “equal protection of the laws,” 
or “commerce . . . among the several states.”101  And, as Kadderly 
indicated, courts can construe the phrase “republican form of 
government” without engaging in nonjudicial activity.  A given 
court’s interpretation of the Guaranty Clause might be wrong, but 
there is nothing about the Guaranty Clause that defies illumination by 
traditional interpretive tools that are used with respect to other 
abstractly worded but judicially enforced provisions.  Indeed, the U.S. 
 
97 See WIECEK, supra note 41, at 127–28; see also Linde, supra note 30, at 29–30 
(paraphrasing WIECEK, supra note 41, at 127–28, to assert that seating a congressional 
delegation does not establish that a government is republican because Congress cannot be 
expected to consider the issue during an opening-day formality when no prior objection 
has been made). 
98 This is particularly true with respect to unrepublican developments at the local level.  
Surely the Guaranty Clause applies to municipal governments, but it is inconceivable that 
Congress could review the lawmaking processes of the 89,000 local governments in the 
United States as part of its proceedings to seat congressional delegations from the states.  
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS BY 
TYPE AND STATE: 2007, available at http://www.census.gov/govs/cog/ 
GovOrgTab03ss.html. 
99 As one commentator observed in the wake of Pacific Telephone, it would be 
“unthinkable” that Congress would deprive a state of its congressional representation.  
Direct Legislation Not Unconstitutional, OUTLOOK, Mar. 9, 1912, at 516. 
100 See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 1401 (1911) (statement of Rep. Mann).  More recently, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), casts doubt 
on Congress’s power to refuse to seat qualified, duly elected members from a state. 
101 Cf. WIECEK, supra note 41, at 287, 303. 
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Supreme Court in Baker noted that the Guaranty Clause is not beyond 
judicial construction.102 
There is perhaps more force to the prudential concerns that 
sometimes are raised with respect to judicial enforcement of the 
Guaranty Clause.  The specter of disagreement or, worse, 
confrontation between the Court and the political branches with 
respect to the republican character of a given state troubles some.  Of 
course, there is the same possibility of disagreement and 
confrontation with respect to other constitutional provisions that are 
judicially enforced. 
Moreover, to the extent that prudential concerns should influence 
the assertion of jurisdiction, there is one powerful, pragmatic reason 
for the U.S. Supreme Court to treat Guaranty Clause claims as 
justiciable in the ordinary case: the need for a uniform, federally 
provided interpretation.  As Hans Linde correctly observed, Pacific 
Telephone does not foreclose judicial enforcement of the Guaranty 
Clause; it only forecloses federal judicial enforcement.103  State courts 
remain free, even after Pacific Telephone, to enforce the Guaranty 
Clause.  Indeed, the result of Pacific Telephone was not to displace 
Kadderly; to the contrary, it left Kadderly as the law of the land in 
Oregon.  Not only may state courts adopt ill-formed or dubious 
interpretations of the clause—as the Oregon Supreme Court did in 
Kadderly—courts in different states may reach different 
interpretations of the clause.  The meaning of a “republican form of 
government” may be open to reasonable debate, but surely our 
constitutional order would be better off with a definitive answer 
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court, rather than a crazy quilt of 
divergent interpretations reached by state courts.104 
In short, once the analytical focus is limited to the question 
whether a given lawmaking process is republican in form, there is no 
good reason for federal courts to refuse the exercise of 
congressionally granted jurisdiction to enforce the requirements of the 
Constitution.  In the absence of extraordinary circumstances that 
make the general rule inapplicable, Guaranty Clause challenges to 
particular lawmaking processes do not present nonjusticiable 
“political questions.” 
 
102 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222 n.48 (1962). 
103 Linde, supra note 31, at 20. 
104 Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 416 (1821) (noting that need for interpretive 
uniformity supported existence of jurisdiction by U.S. Supreme Court over state court 
decisions). 
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V 
UNDERSTANDING PACIFIC TELEPHONE 
The Court’s curious refusal to entertain federal jurisdiction raises 
the question why the Court would remove the federal judiciary from 
the controversy surrounding the adoption of direct democracy.  That it 
wanted to do so is clear not only from the result of Pacific Telephone 
but also the weak reasoning embraced by the Court to justify its 
decision.  Neither Luther nor the illusory fears of political anarchy 
compelled the Court to stay its hand.  Rather, those considerations 
were makeweights called into service by a Court that wished to have 
nothing of this fight for other, unstated reasons.  But what could they 
be? 
At a certain level, inquiries into the underlying motivations of the 
Court must necessarily be conjecture.  We cannot know with certainty 
what forces—intellectual, political, or otherwise—animated the 
justices.  Nevertheless, courts, like any institution, take action for a 
reason, and we can try to make sense of the Court’s action, 
particularly when, as here, its own explanation is so transparently 
incomplete (at best) or disingenuous (at worst). 
A.  Conventional Explanations 
The most obvious candidate for the Court’s decision to treat the 
Guaranty Clause challenge to direct democracy as nonjusticiable is 
that the Court wished to refrain from intruding on matters of state 
sovereignty by reviewing state political processes, particularly when 
the constitutional basis for doing so—the Guaranty Clause—is so 
ambiguous.  Alexander Bickel, for example, praised Pacific 
Telephone as an “exercise of self-restraint” by the Court.105  Perhaps 
the Court felt the need to eschew what it saw as an invitation for 
judicial activism, but that seems highly doubtful.  Pacific Telephone 
was decided only seven years after Lochner v. New York, in which the 
Court impressed the Due Process Clause into service as a vehicle for 
the judicial review of the substantive merits of state and local 
legislation.  The Guaranty Clause, even at it broadest reading, would 
not license the wide-ranging judicial review and concomitant 
intrusion into state sovereignty that the comparatively vacuous 
 
105 9 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910–
21, at 311 (1984). 
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doctrine of economic substantive due process at the time entailed.  
Moreover, even the most avid commitment to judicial restraint does 
not justify the wholesale abandonment of an express constitutional 
guarantee as Pacific Telephone accomplished.  Whatever the doubts 
regarding the exact meaning of “republican form of government,” 
those doubts did not justify leaving that Guaranty entirely to the 
political process. 
Alternatively, perhaps the Court did not want to place itself in a 
position in which its decisions would conflict with those made by the 
federal political branches.  A judicial determination that a particular 
state lacked a republican government might contradict a contrary 
assessment by Congress, which, so the argument goes, would 
embarrass the U.S. Supreme Court and perhaps lead to retaliatory 
measures by Congress. 
At least in this general formulation, the “political confrontation” 
rationale seems implausible because the possibility of conflict is so 
remote (and is certainly not so inevitable to justify the wholesale 
abdication of judicial enforcement of the Guaranty Clause).  As 
discussed above, the Court envisioned that Congress would consider 
the republican character of each state government in deciding whether 
to seat that state’s congressional delegation.  Given the reality that 
Congress does not use that ceremonial occasion to do so, however, 
the Court was mistaken.  Certainly in the absence of a specific 
congressional floor debate regarding the republican character of a 
given state’s government, the Court had no basis to assume that 
Congress had considered the bona fides of the state government.  
And, not to gild the lily: there was certainly no evidence that 
Congress, in seating the Oregon congressional delegations since 1902, 
had formed a definitive view of the republican nature of the Oregon 
state government. 
Likewise, while a judicial decision might contradict any 
determination Congress may have made in admitting a state into the 
Union, that conflict would be more formal than real.  To be sure, 
when admitting a state into the Union, Congress typically recites that 
the proposed state constitution is “republican” in character; however, 
a judicial determination that a particular state’s government is not 
republican would only contradict that congressional determination 
with respect to state lawmaking processes as they existed at the time 
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of the state’s admission into the Union.106  Pacific Telephone, of 
course, involved a challenge to a state constitutional amendment that 
altered the very form of state government that Congress had endorsed 
as republican in 1859 when it admitted Oregon.107  Hence, at least 
with respect to subsequent alterations to the state constitution, judicial 
review under the Guaranty Clause could potentially reaffirm, not 
undermine, the admitting Congress’s will.  Moreover, because the 
current Congress need not necessarily share the same view of 
republican government as the prior Congress that admitted the 
challenged state into the Union, it is unclear that judicial invalidation 
of state lawmaking processes that existed at the time of admission 
would offend the current Congress.  And, at least for a Court fearful 
of political confrontation and congressional retaliation, it would be 
the current Congress, not a Congress of a half-century earlier, whose 
views would matter. 
This last insight may point to the real reason why the U.S. Supreme 
Court so desperately wanted to avoid a decision on the merits in 
Pacific Telephone.  It was not so much that the Court felt the need to 
honor the 35th Congress’s decision in 1859 to admit Oregon as a state 
or the 58th and ensuing Congress’ decisions to seat representatives 
and senators from Oregon after the adoption of the initiative and 
referendum amendment in 1902.  Rather, it was because the Court 
feared inserting itself into the constitutional debate regarding direct 
democracy that was raging in 1911, both within the 62nd Congress 
and between Congress and President William Taft.  At the time, like 
other items on the Progressive agenda, direct democracy generated 
substantial partisan debate with Democrats and progressive 
Republicans generally supporting it and traditional Republicans 
typically opposing it.108  Moreover, this partisan debate had erupted 
with particular severity in the months leading up to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Pacific Telephone, during the battle over the 
admission of Arizona to the Union.  Pacific Telephone may be best 
understood as the product of a desire by the Court to avoid inserting 
itself into the heated, partisan, interbranch debate over direct 
 
106 Even then, the admission may not be conclusive as to Congress’s will at the time if 
Congress did not separately consider the republican character of a given lawmaking 
process later challenged in court.  Linde, supra note 30, at 30 (citing Ex Parte Wagner, 95 
P. 435, 436 (Okla. 1908)). 
107 Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); An Act for the Admission 
of Oregon into the Union, ch. XXXIII, 11 Stat. 383 (Feb. 14, 1859). 
108 CRONIN, supra note 1, at 52. 
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democracy that the recent admission of Arizona both revealed and 
aggravated. 
B.  Arizona and the Progressive Agenda 
The fault lines in the congressional battle over Arizona statehood 
began to take shape in 1907, five years before Pacific Telephone.  
That year, Congress admitted Oklahoma as a state.  Notably, 
Oklahoma’s Constitution contained the initiative and referendum, 
making it the first state to be admitted with such provisions in its 
original constitution.109  That victory for progressive proponents of 
direct democracy, however, was short-lived.  The progressive 
Republican President Theodore Roosevelt was succeeded in 1909 by 
the more traditional, conservative Republican President William Taft.  
Taft disliked the initiative and referendum, which he viewed as signs 
of a “rising tide of radicalism in the West.”110  In fact, in October 
1909, Taft visited the Arizona territory and expressly warned its 
citizens not to copy the Oklahoma Constitution, which he derided as 
the product of a “zoological garden of cranks.”111  Two years after 
Taft’s election, however, dissatisfaction with the Taft administration 
produced an upheaval in the 1910 congressional mid-term elections.  
Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives for the 
first time since 1842, and while Republicans nominally retained 
control of the Senate, the Senate Republicans were split between the 
conservatives, led by Senator Nelson Aldrich, and the progressives, 
led by Senator Robert LaFollette.  With the Senate almost evenly 
split, the eight progressive Republican Senators effectively controlled 
the balance of power.112  The stage was set for a showdown between 
the President and Congress and between progressives and 
conservatives over the progressive agenda, which included the 
promotion of direct democracy. 
 
109 OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1907). 
110 JOHN BRAEMAN, ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE: AMERICAN NATIONALIST 172 (1971) 
(citing Letter from Taft to Joseph Cannon (June 17, 1909)). 
111 John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 31 
(1988) (citing Arizona Gazette, Oct. 13, 1909, at 1, cols. 1–2). 
112 GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE BIRTH OF 
MODERN AMERICA: 1900–1912, at 273 (1958).  Republicans held sixty of the ninety-two 
seats in 1910.  See U.S. Senate, Party Division in the Senate 1789–Present, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited 
June 1, 2009). 
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In 1910, Congress had passed an enabling act authorizing both 
New Mexico and Arizona to convene constitutional conventions to 
draft state constitutions as a prelude to admission.113  In New Mexico, 
Republicans secured the most seats at the New Mexico convention, 
and the resulting constitution omitted the initiative entirely and 
contained a watered down version of the referendum that made 
popular referenda highly difficult to undertake.114  New Mexico’s 
decision to eschew direct democracy pleased conservatives, including 
President Taft, who formally approved the proposed constitution.115 
The admission of Arizona, however, was fraught with difficulty.  
Both the national Democratic and Republican parties backed 
statehood for Arizona in principle.116  When the time came to elect 
delegates to the constitutional convention, however, the territorial 
Democratic and Republican parties took opposing sides with regard to 
the initiative and referendum, which became the predominant issue in 
the election.117  In contrast to New Mexico, Democrats won a 
sizeable majority in the Arizona convention, securing forty-one of the 
fifty-two seats.  Moreover, thirty-nine of the delegates pledged during 
the campaign to support the initiative and referendum.118 
When the convention convened in October 1910, the adoption of 
direct democracy was one of the first measures considered, with 
support for it understandably strong.  Democratic delegates favorably 
examined the Oklahoma and Oregon constitutional provisions 
 
113 Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910). 
114 A petition to refer a legislative measure to the people had to be signed by not less 
than ten percent of the qualified electors in each of three-fourths of the counties and, in 
aggregate, by not less than ten percent of the entire state electorate.  N.M. Const. art. IV, § 
1 (1911); see also Jerry W. Calvert, A Popular Referendum Device and Equality of Voting 
Rights—How Minority Suspension of the Laws Subverts “One Person-One Vote” in the 
States, 6 CORNELL L.J. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 388 (1997). 
115 See 47 CONG. REC. 1234 (1911) (statement of the clerk reading letter from President 
Taft to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives dated Feb. 24, 1911). 
116 Democratic Party Platform of 1908, reprinted in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 
144, 149 (Donald Bruce Johnson ed., rev. ed. 1978); Republican Party Platform of 1908, 
reprinted in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 157, 162 (Donald Bruce Johnson ed., rev. 
ed. 1978).  Even before he left office, President Roosevelt had endorsed the admission of 
Arizona as a state—a position that President Taft likewise embraced.  See Theodore 
Roosevelt, Eighth Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1908), reprinted in III THE STATE OF THE 
UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790–1966, at 2327 (Fred L. Israel ed. 1966); 
William Taft, First Annual Message (Dec. 7, 1909), reprinted in STATE OF THE UNION 
MESSAGES, supra, at 2364. 
117 Charles Foster Todd, The Initiative and Referendum in Arizona 18 (1931) 
(unpublished masters thesis, University of Arizona). 
118 Leshy, supra note 111, at 32. 
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regarding direct democracy and extolled the virtues of popular 
participation in government.119  Republican opponents responded that 
the inclusion of the initiative, referendum, and recall might cost 
Arizona its bid for statehood.120 One delegate in particular attacked 
the initiative as inconsistent with the Guaranty Clause, expressly 
pointing to the Pacific Telephone litigation then pending before the 
U.S. Supreme Court.121  Adding credibility to the Republicans’ 
prediction, President Taft visited Arizona while the convention was in 
session and, reprising statements made a year earlier, criticized the 
Oklahoma Constitution in a transparent attempt to dissuade the 
Arizona delegates from embracing direct democracy.122 
Neither the Republicans’ resistance nor Taft’s opposition to direct 
democracy deterred the delegates, who overwhelmingly approved the 
initiative, referendum, and, perhaps most importantly, a recall for all 
public officials, including judges.123  The recall of judges was 
particularly important to the Democratic Party’s labor supporters, 
who viewed the recall power as a way to restrain pro-business judges 
from interfering in labor disputes by issuing labor injunctions.124  
Taft’s repeated admonitions to Arizonans to eschew direct democracy 
did have one tangible effect on the convention proceedings, however.  
Near the end of the convention, after the provisions adopting direct 
democracy had been approved, the convention chaplain opened the 
proceedings with the prayer that President Taft not veto Arizona’s 
admission “for a little thing like the initiative and referendum; Lord, 
don’t let him be so narrow and partisan as to refuse us self-
government.”125  On December 9, 1910, the delegates approved the 
proposed constitution by a wide margin,126 and, on February 9, 1911, 
the voters of Arizona overwhelmingly ratified the constitution, 
 
119 DAVID R. BERMAN, ARIZONA POLITICS & GOVERNMENT: THE QUEST FOR 
AUTONOMY, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT 33 (1998); Leshy, supra note 111, at 99. 
120 Leshy, supra note 111, at 102, 105 & n.667. 
121 Id. at 105. 
122 Russell Roush, The Initiative and Referendum in Arizona: 1912–1978, at 115 (1979) 
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Arizona State University) (citing George S. Hunter, “The 
Bull Moose Movement in Arizona,” 10 ARIZONA AND THE WEST 343–62 (1968)). 
123 Roush, supra note 124, at 124; STEVEN L. PIOTT, GIVING VOTERS A CHOICE: THE 
ORIGINS OF THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 144 (2003). 
124 H.A. Hubbard, The Arizona Enabling Act and President Taft’s Veto, 3 PAC. HIST. 
REV. 307, 322 (1934). 
125 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 35; Leshy, supra note 111, at 105. 
126 PIOTT, supra note 123, at 144.  The ultimate vote was 41–11 in favor.  BERMAN, 
supra note 119, at 33. 
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sending it to Congress and President Taft for their approval as 
required by the Enabling Act.127 
Back in Washington, conservative Republicans seized upon the 
provisions in the proposed Arizona Constitution regarding direct 
democracy as an attack on representative government and the rule of 
law.  In the summer of 1911, in an address to the Yale Law School, 
Taft’s Attorney General, George Wickersham, lambasted the “new 
scheme of government by initiative, referendum and recall embodied 
in the constitutions of Oklahoma and Arizona” as fundamentally 
unrepublican.128  After praising New Mexico for largely eschewing 
direct democracy, Wickersham attacked the proposed Arizona 
Constitution as a vehicle for the suppression of the majority by a 
small handful of motivated voters.  Wickersham’s language and tone 
were trenchant.  Noting that revolutionary France and Switzerland 
had adopted similar systems, Wickersham caustically warned that to 
adopt a system of direct democracy “would be to substitute for the 
institutions which are the growth and evolution of centuries of 
American experience, the devices of French revolution and Swiss 
socialism.”129 
The constitutionality of direct democracy likewise divided 
Congress, which debated the admission of Arizona and New Mexico 
in the spring and summer of 1911.  Opponents of Arizona’s admission 
seized upon its embrace of direct democracy.  Although the recall of 
judges drew some of the most caustic attacks,130 opponents also 
rejected the initiative and referendum as both dangerous and 
unconstitutional.131  Viewing “republican” government as 
 
127 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 35; Leshy, supra note 111, at 56–57.  The vote was 
12,187 in favor to 3302 opposed. 
128 George W. Wickersham, New States and Constitutions, 21 YALE L.J. 1, 29 (1911). 
129 Id. at 31. 
130 See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 3691 (1911) (statement of Sen. Root) (decrying judicial 
recall as “degeneracy”); 47 CONG. REC. 3723 (statement of Sen. O’Gorman) (declaring 
judicial recall “to be the most destructive and the most revolutionary assault ever made 
upon the stability of our Government”); see also 47 CONG. REC. 1327 (statement of Rep. 
Willis) (acknowledging that referendum is “probably” republican but opposing judicial 
recall); 47 CONG. REC. 1402 (statement of Rep. Mann); 47 CONG. REC. 1448–49 
(statement of Rep. Crumpacker); 47 CONG. REC. 3695  (statement of Sen. Nelson) 
(opposing judicial recall as unrepublican); 47 CONG. REC. 3697, 3712 (statement of Sen. 
Crawford); 47 CONG. REC. 3733 (statement of Sen. Bradley) (opposing judicial recall as 
unrepublican); 47 CONG. REC. 4222 (statement of Rep. Howland); 47 CONG. REC. 4231 
(statement of Rep. Cannon) (opposing judicial recall as unrepublican). 
131 See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 1251 (statement of Rep. Legare); 47 CONG. REC. 1444 
(statement of Rep. Crumpacker); 47 CONG. REC. 1504 (statement of Rep. Littleton); 47 
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synonymous with “representative” government,132 they attacked the 
initiative for allowing the people to bypass the representative 
institutions of government.133  Even the referendum, which does not 
entirely displace the role of the legislature, was challenged by some as 
unrepublican.134  In fact, implying that direct democracy would 
ultimately lead to despotism, Representative Julius Kahn (R-CA) 
hyperbolically attributed the fall of the French Republic and the 
establishment of Napoleon’s dictatorship to the referendum.135  More 
disparagingly, Senator Weldon Heyburn (R-ID) asserted of Arizona’s 
proposed admission with provisions for direct democracy, “[w]e want 
no freaks in this household of States.”136 
In response, supporters of Arizona’s admission urged a more 
limited understanding of the Guaranty Clause as forbidding only 
monarchial or aristocratic forms of government and endorsed the 
constitutionality of direct democracy as consistent with republican 
government by empowering the people to rule themselves.137  
 
CONG. REC. 2795 (statement of Sen. Sutherland); 47 CONG. REC. 3735 (statement of Sen. 
Bailey); 47 CONG. REC. 4125 (statement of Sen. Heyburn). 
132 47 CONG. REC. 1523, 4231 (statement of Rep. Cannon); 47 CONG. REC. 3712 
(statement of Sen. Crawford); 47 CONG. REC. 3735 (statement of Sen. Heyburn). 
133 See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 1341, 1346 (statement of Rep. Kahn); 47 CONG. REC. 1445 
(statement of Rep. Crumpacker); 47 CONG. REC. 1504 (statement of Rep. Littleton); 47 
CONG. REC. 2795 (statement of Sen. Sutherland); 47 CONG. REC. 3735–36, 4120–21 
(statement of Sen. Bailey); see also 47 CONG. REC. 1348 (statement of Rep. Hamilton) 
(noting that initiative’s constitutionality was a close one). 
134 47 CONG. REC. 3735 (statement of Sen. Heyburn); 47 CONG. REC. 4121 (statement 
of Sen. Bailey). 
135 47 CONG. REC. 1340.  Representative Kahn’s hyperbolic attack was not finished.  
Referring to the judicial recall, Kahn declared that, if judges can be recalled, there would 
be no rule of law and, therefore, “the law colleges of that State should all be entirely 
abolished.”  Id. at 1342.  And, as for the initiative, it “would ultimately lead to the 
destruction of all government” and to “anarchy.”  Id. at 1346. 
136 47 CONG. REC. 3735 (statement of Sen. Heyburn).  Not content just to malign 
Arizona, Senator Heyburn also launched into an ad hominem attack on the voters in 
Arizona and other states that had adopted direct democracy.  47 CONG. REC. 4124 (asking 
“are men going mad”); 47 CONG. REC. 4126 (“That is where the initiative comes from—it 
comes from the cranks.”). 
137 See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 311 (statement of Sen. Chamberlain); 47 Cong. Rec. 443 
(statement of Sen. Works); 47 CONG. REC. 1245 (statement of Rep. Martin); 47 CONG. 
REC. 1331–32 (statement of Rep. Anderson); 47 CONG. REC. 1334 (statement of Rep. 
Stedman); 47 CONG. REC. 1411–12 (statement of Rep. Dupre); 47 CONG. REC. 1462 
(statement of Rep. Ferris); 47 CONG. REC. 1472 (statement of Rep. Norris); 47 CONG. 
REC. 1499 (statement of Rep. McGuire); 47 CONG. REC. 1515–17 (statement of Rep. 
Flood); 47 CONG. REC. 1521 (statement of Rep. Sherley); 47 CONG. REC. 4229 (statement 
of Rep. Davenport).  While they endorsed its constitutionality and supported the right of 
each state to select its own form of government within constitutional limitations, not all of 
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Rejecting the notion that republican government meant only 
representative government, one representative invoked Abraham 
Lincoln, declaring that a republican government is one “of the people, 
by the people, and for the people.”138  Indeed, flipping the opponents’ 
attack on itself, Senator George Chamberlain (D-OR) extolled direct 
democracy as “essential to the perpetuation of our institutions and the 
preservation of a republican form of government.”139 
In August 1911, after several months of debate, Congress adopted 
a resolution admitting Arizona as a state.140  In an effort to mollify 
conservative opposition, the resolution required Arizona to hold an 
election at which voters could approve a constitutional amendment 
limiting the recall to executive and legislative officials, but admission 
was not contingent on the voters actually adopting the amendment.141  
That was insufficient for President Taft, who, on August 15, 1911, 
vetoed Arizona’s admission.142  Equating the judicial recall with 
“legalized terrorism,” Taft railed against the recall as “destructive of 
independence in the judiciary” and “injurious to the cause of free 
government.”143  Moreover, responding to proponents of direct 
democracy who defended it as a way to empower popular majorities, 
Taft offered a lengthy and sharp critique of unfettered majoritarian 
government, declaring: 
 
the supporters of Arizona’s admission thought that direct democracy was desirable.  See 
47 CONG. REC. 1411–12 (statement of Rep. Dupre) (opposing initiative, referendum, and 
recall); 47 CONG. REC. 1472 (statement of Rep. Norris) (opposing recall of judges). 
138 47 CONG. REC. 4241 (statement of Rep. Hardy). 
139 47 CONG. REC. 319. 
140 The House of Representatives initially approved the resolution admitting New 
Mexico and Arizona on May 23, 1911.  The exact number of representatives supporting 
the resolution is unknown because no roll call was taken.  47 CONG. REC. 1528 (recording 
that resolution passed on voice vote).  A fairly clear view of the size of support for the 
resolution, however, can be gleaned from two other votes taken that same day within 
moments of the main vote.  On a Republican-sponsored amendment to make Arizona’s 
admission conditioned on the repeal of the judicial recall, the House voted 142–50 against 
the amendment.  47 CONG. REC. 1525.  After the House approved the main resolution, a 
motion to recommit the resolution to the Committee on Territories was rejected by a vote 
of 215-58.  47 CONG. REC. 1528.  In turn, the Senate approved the House resolution on 
August 8, 1911, by a vote of 53-18.  47 CONG. REC. 3742.  The House then concurred in 
the Senate amendments, which were minor and related to New Mexico’s admission, 47 
CONG. REC. 3814, and the joint resolution was presented to the President on August 11, 
1911.  47 CONG. REC. 3829. 
141 See H.J. Res. 14, § 7, 62d. Cong., 1st. Sess. (1911). 
142 47 CONG. REC. 3964–66 (veto message). 
143 Id. at 3964, 3965; see also Campbell, supra note 27, at 432–33 (contending that 
judicial recall “means the destruction of the independence of the judiciary” and “the 
complete overthrow of all government by law”). 
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A popular government is not a government of a majority, by a 
majority, for a majority of the people.  It is a government of the 
whole people by a majority of the whole people under such rules 
and checks as will secure a wise, just, and beneficent government 
for all the people.144 
Taft’s veto of Arizona’s admission because of the judicial recall 
was puzzling on several levels.  As several congressmen noted at the 
time, the recall, even as applied to judges, paled in comparison to the 
sweeping changes in governance wrought by the adoption of the 
initiative and referendum.145  Applied to elected officials (which in 
Arizona included judges),146 the recall would add marginally little 
popular control beyond that already provided by regular, periodic 
elections and, correspondingly, threaten marginally little decrease in 
judicial independence for the same reason.  As a consequence, Taft’s 
focus on the judicial recall while ignoring the initiative and 
referendum was, in the words of Representative John Martin (D-CO), 
akin to “straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel.”147  Moreover, as 
almost everyone including President Taft understood even at the 
time,148 once Arizona was admitted, its citizens could amend their 
constitution to reinsert the judicial recall without any interference 
from Congress or the President—as Arizonans in fact did.  In short, 
Taft’s veto not only focused on the least troublesome mechanism of 
direct democracy, it would not even forestall its ultimate adoption.149 
Following Taft’s veto, Congress immediately enacted a new 
resolution admitting Arizona as a state but this time expressly on the 
condition that Arizona amend its constitution to remove the judicial 
 
144 47 CONG. REC. 3964. 
145 47 CONG. REC. 4220 (statement of Rep. Martin). 
146 Under the Arizona Constitution, state supreme court justices were elected to six-year 
terms, and state superior court judges were elected for four-year terms.  ARIZ. CONST. art. 
IV, §§ 3, 5 (1910). 
147 47 CONG. REC. 4220. 
148 See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 3966 (veto message) (acknowledging that Arizona, once 
admitted, could adopt judicial recall); 47 CONG. REC. 4230 (statement of Rep. Davenport). 
149 In light of these incongruities, one cannot help but think that Taft, acting in the fall 
of 1911 and fully cognizant of the then-pending Pacific Telephone litigation, hoped that 
the Supreme Court would resolve the constitutionality of the initiative and referendum.  
Indeed, Taft’s lengthy and tangential tirade against popular majoritarianism in his veto 
message seemed calculated more to impress a judicial audience than sway popular or 
congressional opinion.  Of course, if Taft hoped that the Court would do the dirty work for 
him and invalidate the initiative, he was to be sorely disappointed. 
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recall.150  President Taft signed the new resolution without 
comment151 and on December 12, 1911, Arizona voters duly 
amended their constitution, limiting the recall to legislative and 
executive officials.152  Taft subsequently acknowledged Arizona’s 
compliance with the congressional resolution and on February 14, 
1912, Arizona was admitted to the Union.153  Ironically, Taft’s and 
the conservative Republican’s efforts to force the repeal of the 
judicial recall were largely for naught: nine months later, as many had 
predicted, Arizona voters amended their constitution to reinsert the 
judicial recall.154 
The fight in Congress over Arizona’s admission both revealed and 
fueled a more fundamental split within the Republican Party that had 
been brewing for years.  Progressive Republicans, such as La Follette, 
had become increasingly disenchanted with President Taft and the 
conservative Republicans.155  In January 1911, La Follette and other 
progressives formed the National Progressive Republican League 
(“NPRL”) with the avowed hope of promoting the progressive 
Republican agenda, including direct democracy.156  By the summer of 
1911, the NPRL decided to field a candidate to challenge Taft for the 
Republican nomination, and, after former President Theodore 
Roosevelt demurred, La Follette announced his campaign for the 
Republican nomination.157  La Follette stumbled early on,158 and, in 
February 1912, Roosevelt changed his mind and announced his 
 
150 47 CONG. REC. 4141 (Senate approval of S.J. Res. 57 by vote of 53-9); 47 CONG. 
REC. (House approval of S.J. Res. 57). 
151 47 CONG. REC. 4381.  Given his dismal view of the Oklahoma Constitution with its 
embrace of direct democracy, Taft’s approval of the revised resolution admitting Arizona 
with the initiative, referendum, and recall of legislative and executive officials is curious. 
152 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 35; Leshy, supra note 111, at 58. 
153 Leshy, supra note 111, at 58.  Carl Hayden, Arizona’s only representative, was 
sworn in to the House on February 19, 1912, while Marcus Smith and Henry Ashurst were 
sworn in to the Senate on April 2, 1912.  47 CONG. REC. 2198, 4146.  Confirming that 
Congress does not use such occasions to assess the republicanness of state governments, 
all three were sworn in without any debate about the character of Arizona’s government, 
even though that very subject had convulsed the Congress just months before. 
154 Leshy, supra note 111, at 58 n.320. 
155 FRANCIS L. BRODERICK, PROGRESSIVISM AT RISK: ELECTING A PRESIDENT IN 1912 
32–33 (1989) (discussing progressive anger at administration’s handling of congressional 
leadership, tariff reform, and conservation of public lands). 
156 Id. at 40; JAMES HOLT, CONGRESSIONAL INSURGENTS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, 
1909–1916, at 49–50 (1967); MOWRY, supra note 112, at 291. 
157 BRODERICK, supra note 155, at 40; HOLT, supra note 156, at 50. 
158 BRODERICK, supra note 155, at 43. 
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intention to run for the Republican nomination as a progressive 
Republican.  Meanwhile, conservative Republicans rallied around the 
incumbent, President Taft.  Roosevelt won significant victories in the 
Republican Midwest heartland, including Taft’s own home state of 
Ohio,159 but Taft’s forces secured a majority of the delegates to the 
national convention.  Fearing progressivism more than defeat in 
November, Taft’s supporters ramrodded his renomination through the 
national convention.160  In response, the Progressives bolted from the 
party and formed their own, the Progressive or “Bull Moose” party, 
with Roosevelt as its presidential nominee.161 
Although the split in the Republican Party was driven by 
differences between progressives and conservatives on a number of 
issues, direct democracy was one of the more salient and important 
issues dividing the two sides.  Roosevelt and the Progressives 
explicitly advocated the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and 
recall.162  In fact, Roosevelt had opened his campaign with the 
express declaration of his support for the right of the people to be able 
to recall individual judicial decisions that they thought erroneous.163  
Roosevelt’s and the Progressives’ embrace of direct democracy, 
especially the judicial recall, horrified conservative Republicans, who 
rallied around President Taft.164  Taft, of course, had already made 
his hostility to direct democracy clear.  His veto of Arizona’s 
admission had cemented the impression that he was an implacable foe 
 
159 HOLT, supra note 156, at 56. 
160 BRODERICK, supra note 155, at 46–56. 
161 Id. at 107–11. 
162 Progressive Party Platform of 1912, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 
116, at 176.  Even before the formal creation of the Progressive party, Roosevelt had 
endorsed the initiative and referendum, Theodore Roosevelt, Nationalism and Popular 
Rule, OUTLOOK, Jan. 21, 1911, at 97, and praised Oregon’s experience with direct 
democracy as having “produced good results.”  Id.  With the formal split from the 
Republican party, however, Roosevelt’s commitment to direct democracy became even 
more strident.  In his acceptance speech at the Progressive party convention—which he 
entitled “A Confession of Faith”—Roosevelt again endorsed and called for the adoption of 
the initiative, referendum, and recall.  Theodore Roosevelt, A Confession of Faith (Aug. 6, 
1912), in SPEECHES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 340, 341–42 (Steven Anzovin & 
Janet Podell eds. 1988).  With the same vehemence that Taft condemned popular rule, 
Roosevelt praised direct democracy as necessary “for giving the people in every state the 
real right to rule themselves.”  Id. 
163 BRODERICK, supra note 155, at 43.  Ironically, like Taft, Roosevelt opposed the 
recall of judges.  Leshy, supra note 111, at 101 n.644. 
164 HOLT, supra note 156, at 59. 
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of direct democracy.165  Moreover, while the Republican party 
platform ultimately adopted by Taft’s supporters did not expressly 
repudiate the initiative or referendum, its hostility to direct democracy 
was apparent to all: Republicans, the platform intoned, “believe in our 
self-controlled representative democracy, which is a government of 
laws, not of men, and in which order is the prerequisite of 
progress.”166  The judicial recall, the platform continued, was 
“unnecessary and unwise.”167 
The presidential election in November 1912 ultimately revealed 
sizeable support for a progressive platform.  The Democratic nominee 
Woodrow Wilson, who had endorsed direct democracy during the 
campaign,168 won a commanding majority of the electoral vote, 
though only a plurality of the popular vote.169  The Progressives 
under Roosevelt, in turn, came in second place.170  Together, the 
Democrats and Progressives took more than sixty-nine percent of the 
popular vote.  Meanwhile, the incumbent President Taft placed a poor 
third, winning only two states (Utah and Vermont).171  In fact, in 
Arizona, which was still smarting from his initial veto of statehood 
just a year earlier, Taft placed fourth behind the Socialist Party 
candidate Eugene Debs.172  Moreover, in the congressional elections, 
Democrats expanded their control of the House, securing over two-
 
165 MOWRY, supra note 112, at 265; 47 CONG. REC. 1469 (1911) (recounting letter 
from Sen. Bailey advising that Taft “does not favor a general initiative and referendum as 
found in Oregon”). 
166 Republican Party Platform of 1912, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 
116, at 183. 
167 Id. at 184. 
168 CRONIN, supra note 1, at 50; 47 CONG. REC. 1469 (recounting statement made by 
then-Governor Wilson approving Oregon system of direct democracy); U’Ren First Gains 
Gov. Wilsons’s Ear, MORNING OREGONIAN, May 18, 1911, at 6 (quoting Wilson as 
endorsing referendum but reserving judgment on judicial recall).  Likewise, the 
Democratic Party platform expressed the party’s belief that only the “larger exercise of the 
reserved power of the people can they protect themselves from the misuse of delegated 
power and the usurpation of government instrumentalities by special interests.”  
Democratic Party Platform of 1912, in 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 116, 
at 175. 
169 BRODERICK, supra note 155, at 207.  In the Electoral College, Wilson won forty 
states with 435 electoral votes; in the popular vote, however, he secured less than forty-
two percent of the votes.  Id. at 207–08. 
170 Id. at 208. 
171 Id. 
172 BERMAN, supra note 119, at 35. 
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thirds of the seats, and seized control of the Senate for the first time in 
twenty years.173 
C.  Pacific Telephone in Context 
It was in the midst of this political tumult that Pacific Telephone 
was argued and decided.  The Oregon Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in February 1909, and the telephone company’s petition 
for writ of error was filed in April 1909.  Strikingly, it took three 
years for the U.S. Supreme Court to take up the case—three years in 
which the constitutionality of direct democracy became the subject of 
increasingly bitter cross partisan and intra-partisan battles.  Briefing 
was belatedly completed only in the fall of 1911, after the protracted, 
raucous debate in Congress over Arizona’s admission, and the Court 
heard oral arguments on November 3, 1911.  Significantly, both the 
telephone company and the state of Oregon drew the Court’s attention 
to the debate over Arizona’s admission.  The telephone company 
quoted President Taft’s August veto message regarding Arizona’s 
admission, while Oregon repeatedly pointed to Congress’s approval 
of Arizona’s constitution in other respects, particularly the initiative 
and referendum.174  The Court was undoubtedly flummoxed by what 
to make of this situation.  When it issued its decision on February 19, 
1912—just five days after Arizona had been admitted into the 
Union—the Court made no mention of the congressional and 
presidential actions just a few months previous, a curious omission 
for a court that had just ruled that the whole matter was appropriately 
left to the political branches to resolve. 
Moreover, for the Republican appointees to the Court, who 
comprised five of the eight sitting justices at the time,175 the emerging 
 
173 BRODERICK, supra note 155, at 207.  Interestingly, during the debate over Arizona’s 
admission, progressive Republicans had warned their more conservative colleagues that 
opposition to direct democracy would cost the party.  See, e.g., 47 CONG. REC. 447 
(statement of Sen. Works) (“I want to say to Senators on this side of the Chamber, 
representing the great Republican Party, that unless the party heeds this demand and 
responds to it by enacting and enforcing these reform measures, it will go down to defeat 
and final destruction and oblivion.”). 
174 Compare Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 48, Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 
U.S. 118 (1912) (No. 822), with Brief for Defendant in Error at 39, 73–74, Pac. Sts. Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).  See also Brief for the State of Washington as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant in Error at 27–28, Brief for Defendant in Error at 39, 
73–74, Pac. Sts. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (emphasizing Congress’s 
vote to admit Arizona with initiative in its constitution). 
175 As noted above, one seat was vacant due to the death of Justice Harlan.  Of the 
remaining eight justices, five were Republicans (Justices McKenna, Holmes, Day, Hughes, 
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split in the Republican Party must have given each pause.  To choose 
sides in the battle over direct democracy was to choose sides in the 
intra-partisan political battle between conservatives and progressives 
engulfing the party.  On the one hand, the judicial endorsement of 
direct democracy would have been viewed as a rebuff to Taft, 
Wickersham, and the other conservatives.  On the other hand, the 
judicial invalidation of direct democracy would have sent howls of 
protest among progressives, stoking their already substantial distrust 
of the judiciary and adding further fuel to the intra-partisan fire 
sweeping the Republican Party.176 
Ironically, the Democratic justices also faced a quandary.  The 
Democratic Party endorsed direct democracy, making the invalidation 
of it an act of partisan betrayal.177  Yet, all three of the Democratic 
justices owed their positions on the Court to President Taft.178  In 
fact, Justices Lurton and Lamar were close friends of President Taft, 
who had appointed both of them primarily, if not exclusively, because 
of those friendships.179  As a consequence, their friendship with the 
President and a felt sense of loyalty as recent appointees must have 
made them reluctant to rebuke the President by expressly endorsing 
direct democracy as constitutional.  Holding that the case was 
nonjusticiable was a nifty way to have their cake and eat it too: the 
practical result of that holding was to clear the way for Oregon and 
other states to adopt direct democracy, but it did so in a way that did 
not embarrass the President.  Thus, for both the Republican and 
 
and Van Devanter) and three were Democrats (Chief Justice White and Justices Lurton 
and Lamar).  It is unclear whether Justice Day participated in the case; due to his wife’s 
critical illness and ensuing death, he was absent from the Court until January 18, 1912, 
while the case was under advisement.  WALTER F. PRATT, JR., THE SUPREME COURT 
UNDER EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE, 1910–1921, at 54 (1999). 
176 Cf. id. at 70–71 (noting that Pacific Telephone and its political question holding 
“could not have come at a more opportune time to blunt the attacks on the courts”). 
177 Interestingly, just a year before Pacific Telephone, Justice Lurton had expressed his 
doubts about the constitutionality of “direct popular legislation.”  Horace H. Lurton, A 
Government of Law or a Government of Men?, 193 N. AM. REV. 9, 12 (1911).  Referring 
to the Guaranty Clause, Lurton wrote that “the guarantee to each State of a republican 
form of government found in the Federal Constitution refers obviously to the character of 
republican governments which then existed [in 1789], a form inconsistent with a pure or 
absolute democracy.”  Id.  The qualifiers “pure” and “absolute,” however, left Lurton 
wriggle room to embrace a mixed system of direct and representative democracy, such as 
that before the Court in Pacific Telephone. 
178 President Taft appointed Justices Horace Lurton and Joseph Lamar to the Court and 
elevated Chief Justice Edward White, who was originally appointed by President Grover 
Cleveland, to the chief justiceship just a year earlier. 
179 PRATT, supra note 175, at 11, 22. 
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Democratic justices, to decide that the issue was nonjusticiable was a 
clean, if unprincipled way to extract the Court from an interbranch, 
intra-partisan debate that none of them were eager to enter. 
Placing Pacific Telephone in this historical context yields several 
important insights.  First, it reaffirms that the U.S. Supreme Court is a 
political institution that is sensitive to the political milieu in which it 
operates.180  Constitutional interpretation at the Court is not some arid 
intellectual exercise divorced from the political realities of the day.  
Rather, the Court is keenly aware of constitutional debates taking 
place outside the Court, and, in general, it is reluctant to unnecessarily 
insert itself into such debates, particularly when doing so would place 
it at the forefront of interbranch, partisan political battles.181  To be 
sure, there are occasions in which the Court makes a stand of 
constitutional principle in a matter convulsing the nation regardless of 
the ramifications for the Court.  Brown v. Board of Education may be 
one such example, even though the Court suffered no significant loss 
of institutional status or authority and ultimately gained much because 
of the decision.  As Pacific Telephone indicates, though, such stands 
of principle are the exception rather than the rule. 
Second, this history underscores the need for a more limited, 
nuanced understanding of Pacific Telephone.  The Court and 
commentators have subsequently read that case as categorically 
consigning the Guaranty Clause to judicial oblivion.  Indeed, it was 
precisely because of that broad reading of the case that the Court, 
when it confronted the constitutionality of the malapportionment in 
the 1960s, was forced to invoke the Equal Protection Clause as the 
foundation for its decision.182  Placed in context, however, Pacific 
Telephone deserves no such categorical reading.  To the contrary, it 
 
180 Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1460–76 (2004) (arguing 
that the Court refused to expressly endorse the dormant Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), because of a fear that expansion of its power of 
judicial review at that time would provoke congressional retaliation). 
181 Of course, there are always exceptions.  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), for 
example, may have been one recent occasion in which the Court failed to appreciate the 
dangers of unnecessary involvement.  As Christopher Eisgruber has observed, the rushed 
consideration given to that case may have obscured the Court’s perception of the need for 
judicial involvement and the dangers of it.  CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 62–63 (2001).  Even here, however, aside from 
much critical commentary, the Court has not suffered any tangible loss of authority or 
congressional rebuke. 
182 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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should be read only as refusing at that time the judicial review of the 
initiative and referendum. 
Third and relatedly, the unique historical circumstances that 
induced the Court to stay its hand in 1912 no longer exist.  Recent 
Congresses have not given sustained attention to the demands of 
republican government in general or the constitutionality of direct 
democracy in particular.  As such, the Court need no longer fear being 
caught in the crossfire of a Congress and President struggling with the 
constitutionality of direct democracy.  Moreover, because those 
institutions have not undertaken the constitutional responsibility that 
the U.S. Supreme Court yielded exclusively to them, it is time for the 
Court to proclaim its willingness and readiness to enforce the 
Guaranty Clause.  As noted above, the Constitution does not require 
the Court to entrust its enforcement exclusively to the political 
branches, and, in light of those branches’ conspicuous nonfeasance, 
judicial enforcement is the only mechanism available at the federal 
level to make the promise of the Guaranty Clause real. 
To be sure, the proponents of direct democracy won a resounding 
victory in the 1912 elections, and, today, direct democracy has been 
embraced in some form by a majority of the states.  That, however, 
does not mean that there is an overwhelming societal consensus in 
favor of direct democracy that should induce the Court to continue to 
avoid the issue.  While direct democracy retains a good deal of 
popularity in principle, few believe as the Progressives did that direct 
democracy enables a virtuous, cohesive, public-spirited majority to 
circumvent a venal, corrupt, self-serving legislature.  The obvious use 
of direct democracy by special interest groups pushing hard edged 
ideological agendas for their narrow benefit has left Americans with a 
more nuanced understanding of both the benefits and disadvantages 
of direct democracy.183  Indeed, in Oregon at least, voters have more 
recently sought to limit, not expand, the scope of direct democracy.184  
Oregonians, like Americans generally, may not subscribe to 
Wickersham’s Panglossian view of representative democracy, but 
 
183 CRONIN, supra note 1, at 5–6; Schuman, supra note 2, at 962; see also Linde, supra 
note 30, at 36–38 (discussing attempts by special interest groups to use initiative in Oregon 
to repress particular minority groups). 
184 Measure 26 (adopted Nov. 5, 2002) (banning payment based on number of 
signatures on initiative and referendum petitions).  In fact, in 2000, not only did Oregon 
voters overwhelmingly approve a constitutional amendment lengthening the time allowed 
for verifying the signatures on petitions, Measure 78 (adopted May 16, 2000), they 
overwhelmingly rejected a measure that would have prohibited making the initiative 
process harder to satisfy, Measure 96 (rejected Nov. 7, 2000). 
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they increasingly see representative and direct democracy as 
imperfect alternatives, each with their own benefits and 
disadvantages.185  Moreover, not all forms of direct democracy 
present the same constitutional considerations.  Constitutional 
initiatives, for example, pose much more of a challenge to 
representative democracy than do legislatively sponsored referenda, 
which differ little, if at all, from the plebiscites used throughout early 
American history.186  To lump all forms of direct democracy together 
and declare them all off limits from federal judicial review elides the 
potentially significant and constitutionally dispositive differences 
among them. 
None of this bears upon how the Court should interpret the 
Guaranty Clause or, more specifically, resolve the constitutionality of 
the various forms of direct democracy.  Those are difficult questions 
upon which reasonable people disagree.187  It is to say, however, that 
the Court should no longer refuse to pass on these matters.  Pacific 
Telephone was a product of its time, and times have changed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Pacific Telephone cleared the way for the widespread adoption of 
direct democracy throughout the nation.  In Oregon, Pacific 
Telephone effectively ended the judicial attack on direct democracy.  
Together with Kadderly, which foreclosed any constitutional attack in 
state court on direct democracy, Pacific Telephone ensured that 
opponents of direct democracy in Oregon would be forced to fight 
within the political arena, attempting to persuade Oregon voters at the 
polls to limit or jettison direct democracy. 
More fundamentally, Pacific Telephone effectively read the 
Guaranty Clause out of the Constitution.  As a legal matter, the Court 
was wrong to do so.  Even if the Court’s reluctance to insert itself into 
the political tumult surrounding the rise of progressivism and direct 
democracy in the early twentieth century made sense at the time, it no 
 
185 CRONIN, supra note 1, at 2, 9. 
186 Interestingly, even at the time of Pacific Telephone, this difference among forms of 
direct democracy was not lost upon the protagonists.  The telephone company expressly 
disclaimed any attack on referenda, which it acknowledged as posing a different 
constitutional question. 
187 The meaning of a “republican form of government” is far from clear.  Some Framers 
believed that it forbade only monarchal or aristocratic government, while others suggested 
that it encompassed a more robust commitment to representative democracy.  JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 122–23 (1980). 
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longer does so now.  The Guaranty Clause is part of the Constitution, 
and, like the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, it is 
capable of and entitled to judicial enforcement by the federal courts. 
